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ILLICIT LEGISLATIVE MOTIVATION
AS A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE-A
CASE FOR CONSIDERATION:
THE UTAH FIRING SQUAD
MARTIN R. GARDNER*
The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deedfor the wrong reason.**
I. INTRODUCTION
One constitutional commentator has described the question of
whether constitutionally illicit motivation' can or should play a deter-
minative role in invalidating otherwise permissible legislation as "one
of the most muddled areas of our constitutional jurisprudence."2 An-
other scholar has noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's traditional confu-
sion about the relevance of legislative . . . motivation in determining
the constitutionality of government actions has . . . achieved disaster
proportions."' 3 Given this disarray of constitutional affairs, one would
expect an outpouring of scholarly comment to assist the courts in sort-
ing out the problem of judicial review of illicit motivation. Apart from
the two above-mentioned commentators and a few others,4 however,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
** T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL.
1. "Illicit motivation" is defined, for the purposes of this paper, to mean impermissible crite-
ria or objectives that may play a role in the decisionmaking process of legislators when the consid-
eration of legitimate criteria may achieve the same result or justify the result in terms of legitimate
objectives. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Leg-
is/aive Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 115. This paper thus does not attempt a distinction, some-
times offered, between legislative "motives" and "purposes." For a discussion of the disutility of
the motive-purpose distinction, see Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21 (1970); Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal ConstitutionalAd-
judication, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1887, 1887 n.1 (1970). See also Brest, siupra, at 100-01, 111, 114.
2. Brest, supra note 1, at 99.
3. Ely, supra note 1, at 1207.
4. See generaly L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 835-37 (1978); Brest, supra
note 1; Ely supra note 1; Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22-26 (1973);
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scholars have not given extensive academic treatment to the subject..
This paucity of scholarly attention may exist because the problem of
unconstitutional motivation is largely perceived as a matter of aca-
demic interest only; courts have traditionally refused to invalidate leg-
islation solely because it is the fruit of a legislative tree poisoned by
inappropriate objectives.' Judicial focus is usually directed, or at least
is said to be directed, to the constitutionality of the effects of legislation
and not to its motivations.' A preference for judicial review in terms of
effects rather than motives reflects a general reluctance to premise con-
stitutional doctrine on the genetic fallacy; a product of lowly origins is
not itself necessarily tainted.
More specifically, four main objections are traditionally raised
against the claim that it is sometimes proper to invalidate statutes solely
because the legislature acted with improper motivation. First, courts
experience great difficulty in ascertaining the legislative motivation of a
multimember decisionmaking body.' Second, even if courts could dis-
Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional.4dudication, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1887 (1970);
Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L. J. 123 (1972).
5. See Brest, supra note I, at 102.
6. "The established view is that inquiries into motive are not open in the Supreme Court."
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
208 (1962). Professor Bickel distinguishes between "motives" and "purposes." He defines "pur-
pose" as the "Court's objective assessment of the effect of a statute or a conclusionary term denot-
ing the Court's independent judgment of the constitutionally allowable end that the legislature
could have had in view." Id. at 209. "Motive," on the other hand, refers to an actual subjective
legislative state of mind that, theoretically, could be derived only through legislative psychoanaly-
sis. Id. at 208-10. The Court has itself often denied scrutiny of legislative motivation as a basis
for invalidating legislation. "The decisions of this Court from the beginning lend no support
whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the
assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted." United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)).
7. The Supreme Court has never "held that a legislative act may violate equal protection
soley because of the motivations of the men who voted for it." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
224 (1971). In reference to certain cases that at first blush appear to rest entirely on legislative
motivation as a basis for unconstitutionality, the Palmer Court noted that "the focus in those cases
was on the actual effect of the enactments [rather than on motivation]." Id. at 225. See also
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
8. Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the
issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legis-
lators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound
decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of mis-
reading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a
statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what
fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact
it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void
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cern illicit motivation in a given case and invalidate the tainted legisla-
tion merely because of such motivation, the legislature could simply
reenact the same measure for proper purposes, thus making the invali-
dation an exercise in futility.9 Third, to void for improper motivation a
law that achieves a desirable goal is counterproductive.' 0 Finally, scru-
tiny of legislative motivation calls into question the good faith and in-
tegrity of the legislative branch, thus implying judicial disrespect to a
separate branch of government." I
Despite these objections, some commentators have argued that pub-
lic policy and certain substantive legal doctrines require invalidation of
legislation designed to serve illicit objectives. For example, the stan-
dard of review under the establishment-of-religion clause invites scru-
tiny of legislative motivation.' 2 It appears, however, that no court has
ever held violative of the establishment clause a statute lacking signifi-
cant religious effect simply because the measure was the product of im-
proper religious motivation.' 3 Furthermore, no one has analyzed in
depth the doctrinal merits of the problem of illicit motivation as
grounds for invalidating legislation under the establishment clause.
The scant scholarly opinion that does exist is divided over the wisdom
and legality of invalidating statutes simply because the legislation is
religiously motivated."' The claim that religious motivation justifies in-
essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted
power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another
legislator made a "wiser" speech about it.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (footnote omitted). See also Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).
9. IT]here is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of
the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than
because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legisla-
ture . . . repassed it for different reasons.
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971).
10. See Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35
MD. L. REv. 555, 561-62 n.24 (1976); Ely, supra note 1, at 1215-17.
11. See A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 208-21; Note, Deyelopments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1091-1101 (1969).
12. See Brest, supra note 1, at 100; Ely, supra note 1, at 1209-11.
13. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), is perhaps the case that comes closest to invali-
dating a religiously motivated statute merely because of its origins without any attention to its
religious effect. Although the Court clearly invalidated the Epperson statute solely because of
religious motivation, see Ely, supra note 1. at 1318, it is also clear that the statute in Epperson had
the effect of aiding fundamentalist Christianity by prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary theory
in the public schools of Arkansas. See 393 U.S. at 106-10. For an extensive discussion of Epper-
son, see notes 176-92 infra and accompanying text.
14. For a view favoring invalidation simply because of illicit legislative motivation, see Brest,
Number 2]
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validation, therefore, is controversial and largely conjectural.
This article tests the thesis that the religious motivation of legislators,
apart from the religious effects of their legislation, is sometimes a le-
gally and philosophically sufficient basis for striking down legislation
under the establishment clause. The inquiry will focus on the legality
of the Utah firing squad. Constitutional assessment of shooting as a
mode of execution is itself a matter of considerable practical interest
and importance;t 5 worldwide attention focused on the firing squad
supra note 1. For a view that favors invalidation for illicit motive only in cases of "random" or
"discretionary" legislative choices, see Ely, supra note 1. Ely would find illicit legislative motiva-
tion sufficient grounds for invalidating statutes in some establishment cases, e.g., where the legisla-
ture has "discretion" to regulate school curricula and excises evolutionary theory to aid
fundamentalist Christianity, but not in other establishment cases, e.g., Sunday Closing Laws
where legislative choice is not simply a matter of "discretion" but can be rationally justified in
terms of legitimate secular goals. Id. at 1318, 1324-27. For a view that suggests sectarian motiva-
tion never may be sufficient grounds for invalidation under the establishment clause, see Choper,
The Establishment Clause andAidto ParochialSchools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260, 278 (1968). Profes-
sor Choper's position is that legislative "purpose," as distinguished from "motive," is a relevant
establishment clause inquiry, but purpose is derived from the objective effects of the legislation
rather than from the subjective intent of the legislature. Id.
15. While the firing squad possesses historically significant religious connotations, its current
religious effects are probably little more than symbolic. See text accompanying notes 18-110 infra.
Nevertheless, there are at least two classes of plaintiffs who might wish to see the firing squad
struck down under the establishment clause: citizens who resent the state's retention of religiously
motivated legislation, and advocates of the abolition of capital punishment who envision invalida-
tion of the firing squad as a means towards the ultimate abolition of capital punishment itself.
"[To defenders of capital punishment] in Utah, with its Mormon traditions, the biblical doctrine
of 'a life for a life' epitomizes the seeming justice of executing [offenders]." H. BEDUAu, THE
COURTS, THE CONSTITUTIoN, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 121 (1977). By establishing that it is
legally inappropriate to support the firing squad by religious considerations, the abolitionist will
have removed what has been, at least historically, an emotionally charged element underpinning
Utah capital punishment law. Adoption of an alternative to the firing squad would force the
legislature to focus entirely on secular considerations in enacting the new law. Thus, the possibili-
ties for rational debate about capital punishment itself, as well as methods of imposing it, will be
enhanced. For an indication that those favoring capital punishment for nonrational reasons may
be converted through rational discourse to the abolitionist point of view, see Sarat & Vidmar,
Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hpothesis,
1976 Wis. L. REV. 171.
It is likely that citizens would have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah's use of
the firing squad. The United States Supreme Court has liberally granted standing to federal tax-
payers to bring suits in federal court under the establishment clause. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968). Most state courts have also permitted such suits by taxpayers. R. MORGAN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND RELIGIo N 96 (1972). Because volunteers who participate in firing squads
are paid modest fees from state funds, Salt Lake Tribune, Sept. 16, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 4, taxpayers
should have standing to attack the firing squad. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court
in dictum quoted approvingly the following statement of James Madison:
[lit is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. . . . That the same
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/7
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when the State of Utah executed Gary Gilmore, 16 ending the lengthy
moritorium on capital punishment and again establishing the death
penalty as a reality of American life. But apart from the inherent im-
port of constitutional scrutiny of the firing squad, examination of Utah
capital punishment law affords particularly rich possibilities for consid-
ering the broader issue of whether religiously motivated statutes are
unconstitutional simply because of their illicit origins. Utah is fertile
ground for discovering and documenting religiously motivated legisla-
tion and thus provides a laboratory for testing the establishment clause
hypothesis examined in the article. Representatives of a uniquely ho-
mogeneous religious culture, which drew virtually no lines between
church and state, founded Utah. At the present time, over half the peo-
ple in the State are members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, the Mormon Church.' 7 Not surprisingly, Utah law often
reflects the religious heritage of its past and the present religious prefer-
ence of the majority of its citizens. The Utah firing squad law is an
example of a law originally enacted, at least in large part, to effectuate
sectarian objectives. The passage of time and modification of Mormon
doctrine have weakened the religious effect of the firing squad, and to-
day its religious significance is largely symbolic. The Utah firing squad
thus provides a useful vehicle for testing the proposition that sectarian
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment
in all cases whatsoever?
Id. at 436 (quoting J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in II
WRITINGS OF MADISON 183, 185-86 (S. Padover ed. 1953)).
It may not even be necessary that a party be a taxpayer to have standing in a constitutional
attack on the firing squad under the establishment clause. In Engel parents of school children
successfully attacked classroom recitation of a prayer as an unconstitutional establishment of reli-
gion. A noted commentator emphasized that the parents neither had to show expenditure of pub-
lic funds nor coercion of their children to possess standing:
One finds asserted in Engel no requirement that a litigant, if he would invoke judicial
power to forbid governmental action, must show that by it he "has sustained or is imme-
diately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."
Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1962) (footnote omit-
ted). See also Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
879 (1973) (standing permitted to raise establishment clause question solely because of plaintiffs
"beliefs about religion"; plaintiff not required to show economic injury or religious coercion).
16. See H. BEDAU, supra note 15, at 121-23.
17. Statistics indicate that 71% of Utah residents are members of the Mormon Church. UTAH
FOUNDATION STATISTICAL REPORT 238 (1977).
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origins alone may be sufficient grounds for holding legislation uncon-
stitutional under the establishment clause.
The analysis herein will show that the example of the Utah firing
squad represents an instance in which establishment clause doctrine
and policy justify invalidating legislation simply because of sectarian
motivation. This article will demonstrate that the usual misgivings
about such invalidation are inapposite in this example. Finally, the
analysis will use the firing squad example as the basis for generating
several general principles offered as a framework for reviewing legisla-
tive motivation in other establishment clause cases.
II. BLOOD ATONEMENT AND THE FIRING SQUAD
The firing squad in Utah raises establishment clause issues because it
is tied, historically at least, to the doctrine of "blood atonement"-a
teaching of the Mormon Church, emphasized primarily in the nine-
teenth century, that requires a form of capital punishment which sheds
the blood of certain offenders, most notably murderers. Utah is unique
both in its distinct Mormon heritage and influence and in its employ-
ment of a mode of execution that actually spills the victim's blood. I"
The existence of the firing squad solely in Mormon Utah is no coinci-
dence; rather, it is a consequence of an attempt to effectuate Mormon
doctrine through the capital punishment law of the state.
Religious justification for the institution of capital punishment is not
unique to the Mormon people; 19 neither is the theological rationale for
the death penalty limited to the State of Utah.20 But while sectarian
18. Utah is the only state to employ the firing squad-a sure means of shedding blood. All
other states that permit capital punishment utilize either hanging, the electric chair, the gas cham-
ber, or lethal injection-none of which necessarily results in spilling the blood of the offender.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014 (West Supp. 1978); TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. tit. 43,
§ 43.14 (Vernon 1977); W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 9-12 (1974); Gardner, Executions
and Indignitlies-An Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39
OHIO ST. LJ. 96, 119-29 (1978).
19. See generally Ingram, The Keystone of Our Penal System, in ESSAYS ON THE DEATH
PENALTY 55 (1963); Taylor, Capital Punishment-Right and Necessary, in ESSAYS ON THE DEATH
PENALTY 45 (1963); Taylor, The Death Penalty, in ESSAYS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 21 (1963).
Religious appeals also are often invoked to support the abolition of capital punishment. See
generally Carpenter, The Christian Context, in THE HANGING QUESTION 29 (1969); Livingston,
The Crime of Employing the Punishment of/Death, in VOICES AGAINST DEATH 15 (1976); Rush,
4bolish the Absurd and Unchristian Practice, in VOICES AGAINST DEATH 1 (1976); Spear, Thou
Shalt Not Kill, in VOICES AGAINST DEATH 78 (1976).
20. "About 55% of American and Canadian subjects who approve of capital punishment
would approve of it even if it had no greater deterrent effect than imprisonment. Most of these
[Vol. 1979:435
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defenses of capital punishment may be commonplace, Mormonism is
unique in its historical emphasis on the necessity of observing particu-
lar methods of execution to conform to divine will. Because of this
concern for the form of implementing the death penalty, as well as the
profound influence of Mormonism in Utah, the impact of religion on
capital punishment law in that state is much more vivid than it is else-
where,2' where appeals to a variety of secular reasons for the death
penalty often conceal religious justifications and obstruct recognition of
the full extent of the sanction's religious undergirding. One may more
readily identify ecclesiastical impact on capital punishment in Utah,
however, because of the distinctly sectarian origins of the firing squad.
This section will trace the doctrine of blood atonement in Mormon
theology and assess the role of the doctrine in shaping Utah's capital
punishment law. The concept of blood atonement in Mormom theol-
ogy is essentially a nineteenth-century phenomenon that the Mormons
very recently officially disavowed.
A. The Blood Atonement Doctrine
Mormon doctrine teaches that Christ's atonement unconditionally
saves the entire human family from physical death-the separation of
the body and spirit that results from Adam's transgression.22 Christ's
atonement also provides salvation from spiritual death-the alienation
subjects indicated as the justification for capital punishment the idea of 'just deserts' and Biblical
ideas of retribution." Kohlberg & Elfenbein, The Development of Moral Judgments Concerning
Capital Punishment, 45 Am. J. ORTHOPSY. 614, 616 (1975).
21. The population of Utah historically has been monolithic. The Mormons settled in the
Valley of the Great Salt Lake after being driven from their prior settlements. The Great Basin
offered the opportunity for development of the Mormon lifestyle in an environment free from
persecution.
There are three major contributory factors to the emergence of a monolithic culture in
Utah. One was the similarity of backgrounds, both cultural and racial, among the early
settlers. The second was the isolation of the community, which would tend to foster the
development of a unique set of social mores. The third was the strong bond of common-
ality of religion held by the immigrants. The religious Weltanschauung of the L.D.S.
Church is such that to the present day there is great cohesiveness among its mem-
bers. . . .The Mormon culture is unique within the annals of history because of its size,
the length of its existence as a viable culture, and the cohesiveness existing among the
people.
For these reasons the practice of execution in Utah must be assumed to be atypical of
other areas in this country.
J. WALTERS, A STUDY OF EXECUTIONS IN UTAH 2 (1973).
22. See L. RICHARDS, A MARVELOUS WORK AND A WONDER 262-81 (1958); J. TALMAGE,
THE ARTICLES OF FAITH 75-89 (12th ed. 1924).
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from God that occurs because of one's actual sins-on the condition
that the individual repent of his/her sins and obey God's command-
ments.23 The doctrine of blood atonement posits that some sins, prima-
rily murder, are so heinous that the atoning sacrifice of Christ is
unavailing as an expiation of the sin of the offender.24 Although the
gravity of their sin apparently makes it impossible for these offenders to
overcome completely "spiritual death" and be "exalted" in the Celes-
tial Kingdom, 25 an offender can achieve a degree of forgiveness if
he/she personally "atones" for the sin by sacrificing his/her life in a
manner that literally sheds the person's blood.26 The doctrine requires
the spilling of blood because it views blood as possessing symbolic reli-
gious significance; hence, Christ shed his blood as a vicarious means of
redemption for the vast majority of mankind.27 But for those who
commit certain grievous sins, the doctrine requires individual atone-
ment.28
It is not entirely clear under what circumstances and for which sins
blood atonement would avail the offender. Some sins, particularly
23. See L. RICHARDS, supra note 22; J. TALMAGE, supra note 22. For treatment of these
general principles of salvation in the context of blood atonement, see C, PENROSE, BLOOD ATONE-
MENT 5-11 (1916).
24. C. PENROSE, supra note 23, at 21. Penrose's sermon on blood atonement, delivered in
1884, is the most systematic development of the blood atonement doctrine by any Mormon leader.
For this reason, discussions of the theory of blood atonement often refer to Penrose.
25. Id. at 19-21. Mormon theology divides heaven into three kingdoms or degrees of glory,
the highest of which is the "Celestial" Kingdom. See DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 76:70-81.
26. It is essential that the blood actually be shed to conform to the doctrine of blood atone-
ment. "The man who commits murder, who imbrues his hands in the blood of innocence, cannot
receive eternal life, because he cannot get forgiveness of that sin. What can he do? The only way
to atone is to shed his blood. Hanging is not the proper method." C. PENROSE, supra note 23, at
21. The doctrine requires the spilling of blood because blood is perceived to possess special sym-
bolic religious significance.
Atonement [through Jesus Christ] could not have been made without the shedding of
blood. The 22nd verse of the 9th chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews says: "And
almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no
remission." There is no remission of sins without the shedding of blood .... Instead
of the blood of the individuals being shed the blood of Christ was shed for them, and it
stands in the place of their blood. What is the reason of that? Why, we are told in the
book of Leviticus, the 17th chapter and 11 th verse: "For the life of the flesh is in the
blood; and I have given it to you upon the alter to make an atonement for your souls; for
it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." . . . [If Christ's blood had not
been shed, each individual would have had to have his blood shed, according to Bible
doctrine.
Id. at 11-12.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 21-23.
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murder committed by baptized Mormons who have been "specially en-
lightened" by the power of the Holy Spirit, apparently can never be
forgiven even if the offender willingly atones for the offense with
his/her own blood.29 For these offenders, however repentent, there
seems to be no hope of overcoming spiritual death. Thus, God forever
banishes those offenders from his presence.30 Apparently, there are few
possible candidates for this class of "specially enlightened" murder-
ers.3' The vast majority of murderers, therefore, would be capable of a
modicum of salvation from their sins if they shed their own blood in
atonement.3 2 It is not clear whether atonement is conditioned on any
particular state of mind of the offender, although willingness to make
restitution through sacrificing one's life appears to be an important, if
not a necessary, factor in achieving forgiveness. 33
Apart from murder, Mormon leaders also taught that sexual miscon-
duct by Church members in certain circumstances, as well as the viola-
tion of certain sacred covenants, would be dealt with through blood
atonement if people lived the complete law of blood atonement. 34
These opinions concerning blood atonement for sins other than murder
did not express a doctrine viable in secular society, but rather, dis-
cussed a theoretical doctrine that operated anciently when no separa-
tion of church and state existed or that would apply in the future when
a ruling theocracy had the power to take life.3 1 Mormons have, how-
29. Id. at 21-22.
30. Id.
31. Apparently, there is hope for some forgiveness for every sin except heinous sins commit-
ted by especially responsible people who are without hope for salvation because they sinned in
spite of special light they had received. Id. at 23. Penrose wrote: "The greater a man's light is,
the greater his sin." Id.
Penrose describes the case in I Corinthians of a man who came into the Church, received the
Holy Ghost, "rejoiced in the truth," and then committed a "gross transgression," apparently incest
with his mother. Penrose suggests that this man might benefit from having his blood shed to atone
as much as possible for his sin. Id. at 19-20. Elsewhere, Joseph Smith intimated that even the
Prophet David was not sufficiently "enlightened" so as to be precluded a modicum of salvation
from his heinous sins. 6 HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 253
(1950).
32. Id.
33. The discussions of blood atonement often speak of the redemptive value of"giving" one's
life for his crimes, thus implying a willingness on the part of the offender to submit to capital
punishment. See C. PENROSE, supra note 23, at 20. Whether "atonement" occurs if life is simply
"taken" against the offender's will is not clear.
34. See Grant, Rebuking Iniquity, in 4 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 49, 49-51 (1857); Kimball,
Sancification, in 7 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 16, 20 (1860).
35. Despite extreme statements by some leaders, the Mormon Church never authorized an
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ever, recognized the possibility of effectuating blood atonement for
murder in modem secular society36 not as an ecclesiastical function, 37
but rather as a possible consequence of secular capital punishment law.
Genesis 9:6 provided the primary scriptural support for the doctrine
of blood atonement, at least for the sin of murder: "Whoso sheddeth
man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."'38 This verse coupled
with I John 3:15 ("No murderer hath eternal life abiding in him"),
Hebrews 9:22 ("And almost all things are by the law purged with
blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission"), and Leviticus
17:11 ("For the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to
you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls: for it is the
blood that maketh an atonement for the soul") laid the foundation
upon which Mormon leaders developed their doctrine.3 9
The first seeds of blood atonement teaching apparently sprouted in
Mormon thought before the Saints settled in Utah. In 1843 Joseph
Smith, the founder and first prophet of Mormonism, argued:
In debate, George A. Smith said imprisonment was better than hang-
ing.
I replied, I was opposed to hanging, even if a man kills another, I will
shoot him, or cut off his head, spill his blood on the ground, and let the
smoke thereof ascend up to God; and if ever I have the privilege of mak-
ing a law on that subject, I will have it so. 40
ecclesiastical practice of blood atonement. Larsen, The Mormon Reformation, 26 UTAH HIST. Q.
45, 62 (1958) ("the church did not officially condone taking life other than through legal process"
and "responsibility for any ... blood shedding must rest upon fanatical individuals"). President
Brigham Young made it clear that the teaching referred to the distant past and the millennial
future. President Young's remarks about blood atonement for adultery make clear that he did not
claim present Church authority to execute adulterors.
The time has been in Israel under the law of God, the celestial law, . that if a man
was found guilty of adultery, he must have his blood shed, and that is near at hand. But
now I say,. . . that if this people will sin no more, but faithfully live their religion, their
sins will be forgiven them without taking life.
Young, To Know God is Eternal Life-God the Father of our Spirits and Bodies-Things Created
Spiritual
, 
First-Atonement By the Shedding of Blood, in 4 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 215, 219
(1857). See also DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 134:10 (official doctrine precludes ecclesiastical au-
thority to take life).
36. See notes 52, 87-105 infra and accompanying text.
37. See DOCTRINE & COVENANTS §§ 42:79, 134:10. See also B. ROBERTs, 4 A COMPREIEN-
SIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 136-37 (1957) (denials by the Mormon Church of any extra-legal
blood atonement).
38. See C. PENROSE, supra note 23, at 21.
39. Id. at 11-12, 21.
40. J. SMITH, 5 HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LAT-rER-DAY SAINTS 296
(1949).
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On another occasion Smith stated: "[H]anging is the popular method of
execution among the Gentiles in all countries professing Christianity,
instead of blood for blood according to the law of heaven."4
Although the Mormons taught, or at least suggested, the doctrine
prior to coming to Utah, Smith's successor, Brigham Young, fully de-
veloped blood atonement theory. In one of his sermons Young stated:
There are sins that men commit for which they cannot receive forgive-
ness in this world, or in that which is to come, and if they had their eyes
open to see their true condition, they would be perfectly willing to have
their blood spilled upon the ground, that the smoke thereof might ascend
to heaven as an offering for their sins; and the smoking incense would
atone for their sins, whereas, if such were not the case, they would stick to
them and remain upon them in the spirit world.
I know when you hear my brethren telling about cutting people off
from the earth, that you consider it is strong doctrine, but it is to save
them, not to destroy them.
...And furthermore, I know that there are transgressors, who, if they
knew themselves, and the only condition upon which they can obtain for-
giveness, would beg of their brethren to shed their blood, that the smoke
thereof might ascend to God as an offering to appease the wrath that is
kindled against them, and that the law might have its course. I will say
further, I have had men come to me and offer their lives to atone for their
sins.
It is true that the blood of the Son of God was shed for sins through the
fall and those committed by men, yet men can commit sins which it can
never remit. . . .There are sins that can be atoned for. . .[only] by the
blood of the man.42
Other Mormon leaders in early Utah, including Jedidiah M. Grant
and Heber C. Kimball, both counselors in the First Presidency of the
Church, also taught the doctrine of blood atonement.43 Significantly,
41. J. SMITH, 1 HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 435
(1951).
42. Young, The People of God Disciolined by Trials-Atonement by the Shedding of Blood etc.,
in 4 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 51, 53-54 (1856).
43. Grant argued:
But if the Government of God on earth, and Eternal Priesthood, with the sanction of
High Heaven, in the midst of all his people, has passed sentence on certain sins when
they appear in a person, has [sic] not the people of God a right to carry out that part of
his law as well as any other portion of it? It is their right to baptize a sinner to save him,
and it is also their right to kill a sinner to save him, when he commits those crimes that
can only be atoned for by shedding his blood. If the Lord God forgives sins by baptism,
and. . . certain sins cannot be atoned for.., but by the shedding of the blood of the
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Young, Grant, and Kimball all played major roles in implementing the
first capital punishment law in Utah.44
Although the most fervent sermons on blood atonement occurred
during the "reformation" movement in the 1850's, a period of intense
Mormon revivalism bordering on fanaticism, 45 nineteenth-century
Church leaders also defended the doctrine, even after the excessive
rhetoric of the "reformation" had subsided. In 1884 George Q. Can-
non, in responding to anti-Mormon critics, proclaimed: "[W]e do not
believe in hanging. We think that if a man sheds blood, his blood
should be shed by execution .... [But it] is a process of law [not a
Church function] and has no reference to any Church ordinance. '46 In
1889 the First Presidency and Council of Twelve Apostles issued an
official proclamation to answer claims that the Mormon Church had
itself practiced blood atonement extralegally: "[W]e regard the killing
of a human being, except in conformity with the civil law, as a capital
crime, which should be punished by shedding the blood of the criminal
after a public trial before a legally constituted court of the land. 4 7
Unlike their nineteenth-century counterparts, modem Mormon lead-
sinner, query, whether the people of God be overreaching the mark, if they should exe-
cute the law. . .. We would not kill a man, of course, unless we killed him to save him.
Deseret News, JuL 27, 1854, at 2, col. 1. For Kimball's views on blood atonement, see Kimball,
Limits of Forbearance--posater---Econompy-Giying Endowments, in 4 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSs
374, 375 (1857); Kimball, Sanctbficaiion, in 7 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 16 (1860).
44. See notes 95-98 infra and accompanying text.
45. This period [1854-55] saw a marked religious reaction, inspired by the leadership of
the church, against a certain laxness that the experiences of the previous decade had
introduced into Mormon behavior. Some Saints were lured by gold to California, there
were quarrels about property, some had been ignoring the Sabbath, stealing was not
unknown, and... "sex sins" had become common, or at least temptation had become
continuous in the circumstances of unsettlement and mobility. The result was the "Mor-
mon Reformation" preached by Jedediah M. Grant, Brigham Young, and others. Mor-
mon missionaries went to every settlement and questioned each person individually
about his sins, ranging from murder, treachery, adultery, failure to pay tithes ... and
even personal cleanliness. It was a kind of Mormon revivalism and was accompanied by
inner anxiety and high emotion....
The result and in part the aim of the movement were to increase group loyalty as well
as religious enthusiasm .... Brigham Young preached the doctrine of "blood atone-
ment" ...
... Blood atonement certainly enkindled... [a violent] sort of spirit, and, although
it seems that it was rarely practiced, the atmosphere was one of inordinate group loyalty
to the point of fanaticism. Obedience to authority became a most important mark of
religious fervor.
T. O'DEA, THE MORMONS 100-01 (1957). See generally Larson, The Mormon Reformation, 26
UTAH HIsT. Q. 45 (1958).
46. Quoted/n J. WALTERS, A STUDY OF ExEcuTIONS IN UTAH 14 (1973).
47. B. ROBERTS, 4 A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 136 (1957). Again in 1891,
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ers rarely discussed blood atonement, perhaps because of growing dis-
enchantment with the doctrine. Several twentieth-century discussions
of Mormon doctrine by Church authorities, however, suggested that
blood atonement has retained some modem vitality as a teaching of the
Church.48  Moreover, despite considerable criticism of blood atone-
Wilford Woodruff, President of the Mormon Church, stated in answer to "scurrilous charges"
against the Mormons:
It is a fundamental doctrine of our creed that a murderer cannot be forgiven; that he
"hath not eternal life abiding in him"; that if a member of our Church, having received the
light of the Holy Spirit, commits this capital crime, he will not receive forgiveness in this
world nor in the world to come.
... It is part of our faith that the only atonement a murderedsic can makefor his "in
unto death'is the shedding of his own blood [through capital punishment as practiced by
the State and not the Church], according to the fiat of the Almighty after the flood:
"Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed." But the law must be
executed by the lawfully appointed officer. This is "blood atonement"so much perverted by
maligners of ourfaith. We believe also in the atonement wrought by the shedding of
Christ's blood on Calvary; that it is efficacious for all the race of Adam for the sin com-
mitted by Adam, and for the individual sins of all who believe, repent, are baptized by
one having authority, and who receive the Holy Ghost by the laying on of authorized
hands. Capital crime committed by such an enlightened person cannot be condoned by
the Redeemer's blood. For him there is "no more sacrifice for sin"; his life is forfeit, and
he can only pay the penalty. There is no other blood atonement taught, practiced or made
part of the creed of the Latter-day Saints.
Letter from Wilford Woodruff to the editor of the Illurtrated.American (January 9, 1891), citedin
Letter from Bruce R. McConkie to Thomas B. McAffee (Oct. 18, 1978) (McConkie letter on file at
the University of Nebraska College of Law) [hereinafter cited as McConkie Letter].
48. Brigham H. Roberts, a general authority and official Church Historian, in discussing the
"divine instructions to the Church," represents the status of blood atonement as follows:
But if, as seems to be the case ... there are certain limitations to vicarious atonement,
even to the vicarious atonement of the Christ, then these ancient laws proclaiming that
the life of the flesh is in the blood, and that "the blood maketh an atonement for the
soul," make plain what is needful for the salvation of the soul where one's sins place him
beyond the reach of vicarious means of salvation--then it is the shedding of the sinners
[sic] own blood that must be referred to.
B. ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 128-29. Likewise, Joseph Fielding Smith, a Mormon Apostle,
stated that Utah capital punishment law grants
unto the condemned murderer the privilege of choosing for himself whether he die by
hanging or whether he be shot, and thus have his blood shed in harmony with the law of
God; and thus atone, so far as it is in his power to atone, for the death of his victim.
J. SMITH, I DocTRINEs OF SALVATION 136 (1954). More recently, Bruce R. McConkie, a present
Mormon Apostle, stated.
But under certain circumstances there are some serious sins for which the cleansing of
Christ does not operate, and the law of God is that men must then have their own blood
shed to atone for their sins. Murder, for instance, is one of these sins; hence we find the
Lord commanding capital punishment.
B. MCCoNKIE, MORMON DOCTRINE 92 (2d ed. 1966). Significantly, in an earlier discussion of
blood atonement, McConkie had stated, "As a mode of capital punishment, hanging or execution
on a gallows does not comply with the law of blood atonement, for the blood is not shed." Id. at
314 (lst ed. 1958). The deletion of the reference to hanging in McConkie's later work indicates
that he had modified his view of the theological significance of blood-spilling modes of execution.
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ment from non-Mormons, 49 the Church, apart from disclaimers of ex-
tralegal practice of the doctrine, never specifically disavowed until very
recently the notion that blood atonement could be effectuated through
the firing squad.
However uncertain the modem status of blood atonement might
have been, it became clear in October 1978 that the Mormon Church
has officially rejected the doctrine as a present teaching of the Church.
The Church now views the shedding of the blood of sinners to remit sin
as a doctrine that is inapplicable in contexts in which a separation of
church and state exists." While the Mormon Church continues to de-
fend the institution of capital punishment itself, the mode of execution
is now theologically irrelevant. Official Church doctrine no longer at-
taches any religious significance to the firing squad.51
But, as suggested above, a very different conception of bloodspilling
modes of capital punishment historically prevailed in Utah. The con-
cept of blood atonement occupied an important place in nineteenth-
century Mormon thought, and as an outward act of religious signifi-
cance, one should not attempt to understand it merely in abstract doc-
trinal terms. 2 That early Mormons did not view blood atonement as a
See McConkie Letter, supra note 47. An allusion to blood atonement is contained in a 1972
editorial in the Church Section of the Mormon Newspaper, the Deseret News, which reads:
Biblical principles are sound, and are as applicable today as they were in ancient times.
One of those principles as taught in scripture was capital punishment.
As far back as the days of Noah the Almighty gave this law: "Whoso sheddeth man's
blood, by man shall his blood be shed ....
Have the opponents of capital punishment ever thought of it in its eternal sense? Is
this one way by which sinful man may atone, at least in part, in the eyes of God, for his
serious offenses?
Deseret News, Feb. 26, 1972 (Church Section), at 16, col. I. Although these few references to
blood atonement suggest that the doctrine possessed some modem vitality, other major twentieth-
century treatments of Mormon doctrine by Church authorities fail to discuss blood atonement.
See e.g., J. TALMAGE, supra note 22, which contains lengthy discussion of the Mormon plan of
salvation without ever mentioning blood atonement. Perhaps significantly, the present Mormon
prophet, Spencer W. Kimball, also fails to mention blood atonement as theologically relevant to
murderers. S. KIMBALL, THE MIRACLE OF FORGIVENESS 127-32 (1969).
49. See, e.g., the sources cited in B. ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 126 n.30.
50. See McConkie Letter, supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. Blood atonement seemed to assume a quasi-sacramental status so far as the crime of
murder was concerned, Cannon, see text accompanying note 46 supra, to the contrary notwith-
standing. Although most Mormon ordinances required Priesthood authority to make them effica-
cious, the State's executions of murderers were apparently seen as religiously significant exercises,
which perhaps bestowed spiritual blessings upon the offender. See notes 87-105 infra and accom-
panying text; C. PENROSE, supra note 23, at 23 (capital punishment by the Stale should not be
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purely hypothetical principle becomes clear upon examination of the
relationship between that doctrine and Utah capital punishment law.
B. Capital Punishment Legislation in Utah
In July 1847 the first company of Mormon pioneers arrived and be-
gan to settle the geographical area embraced within the boundaries of
the State of Utah.5 3 At that time the area belonged to Mexico; Mexico
ceded it to the United States in February 1848 by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. 4
Apart from a few trappers and Indians, the Saints found a wilderness
devoid of people, civilization, or law." A theocracy governed the first
two-and-a-half years of Mormon settlement in the Great Basin and the
Saints made no attempt to establish a secular government.5 6
The first effort towards secular government occurred in 1849 when
the Council of Fifty, the secret governing body of the "political King-
dom of God,"57 drafted a plan for territorial government.5" The Coun-
cil of Fifty, although theoretically a political body distinct from the
abolished because it allows the shedding of blood as atonement for sin according to God's law).
Blood atonement through state execution thus took on the character of a religious ordinance.
53. See J. ALLEN & G. LEONARD, THE STORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 245-47 (1976)
Ihereinafter cited as STORY OF L.D.S.]; Creer, The Evolution of Government in Early Utah, 26
UTAH HIST. Q. 23 (1958).
54. Thomas & Jensen, A Study of the Indeterminate Sentence & Parole in Utah, 21 BULL. U.
UTAH 1, 57 (1931).
55. Skidmore, Penology in Early Utah, 2 UTAH HUMANITIES REV. 145, 145 (1948).
56. STORY OF L.D.S., supra note 53, at 252; Creer, supra note 53, at 27. For a good discus-
sion of government in early Utah, see Morgan, The State Deseret, 8 UTAH HIsT. Q. 65 (1940).
57. The Mormon concept of millenialism implied that manmade governments would ulti-
mately fail and the just rule of Christ would replace them. Daniel's vision of a kingdom rolling
forth to fill the earth was interpreted to mean that a political kingdom was to be established prior
to the millennium. As early as 1842 those closest to Joseph Smith anticipated the establishment of
a political entity outside the regular organization of the Church, although dominated by priest-
hood leaders. The governing body of the kingdom was the Council of Fifty. This body was to
establish a righteous government that would protect the rights of all and prepare the world politi-
cally for the second coming of the Savior and his millennial reign. STORY OF L.D.S., supra note
53, at 186-87; see generall Clark, The Kingdom of God, the Council of Fftiy and the State of Dese-
ret, 26 UTAH HIST. Q. 131 (1958). The Council of Fifty was organized in 1844 in Nauvoo, Illinois,
in 1844 and was a secret body of leading Mormon officials. The body followed the Saints to Utah
and remained a vital force in shaping Utah politics until the 1890's. Hansen, Political Kingdom as
a Source of Conflict, in MORMONISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE 112, 115-26 (1972). The Council
of Fifty was considered the "legislature of the Kingdom of God." Melville, Theory andPractice of
Church and State During the Brigham Young Era, 3 B.Y.U. STUD. No. 1 33, 33 (1960).
58. STORY OF L.D.S., supra note 53, at 253. See also K. HANSEN, QUEST FOR EMPIRE 126-27
(1967).
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Mormon Church, 9 was composed of and controlled by the Mormon
hierarchy and was thus virtually indistinguishable from the Church it-
self.60 While waiting for federal approval of its petition for territo-
rial status, the Council of Fifty established the provisional State of
Deseret,61 apparently to begin realization of the ideals of the political
Kingdom of God.62 Although the Constitution of the State of Deseret
paid lip service to the principle of popular sovereignty, 63 the Council of
Fifty handpicked the first "state" legislature. 64 Members of the
Council filled all of the executive and judicial branches of the new gov-
ernment,65 and the Council elected Brigham Young governor.66
"Church and state were clearly welded together. 67
The General Assembly of the State of Deseret, controlled by mem-
bers of the Council of Fifty,68 adopted a criminal code in 1851 that
59. "[ln theory, the political kingdom of God was to be a pluralistic society that granted
wide latitude to the individual differences of its prospective members. Such a latitude was only
possible if the kingdom and the church were separate organizations." K. HANSEN, supra note 58,
at 37.
60. "For the most part [the Church and the political kingdom] were separate in theory only.
Ultimately, no distinction could be drawn between the two. The priesthood that controlled the
church also controlled the state." Id. at 36. "The basic authority for the Kingdom of God lay in
the authority of the priesthood of the president of the Mormon Church, but the directional control
was vested in. . .the Council of Fifty." Clark, supra note 57, at 134.
61. STORY OF L.D.S., supra note 53, at 253. The Council of Fifty worked out the basic ideas
for the government of the State of Deseret before the Saints migrated to Utah. "The State of
Deseret was the planned result of the doctrine of the political Kingdom of God." Clark, supra
note 57, at 133.
62. K. HANSEN, supra note 58, at 127.
63. Section two of the "Declaration of Rights" of the Deseret Constitution provided:
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free Governments are founded in
their authority, and instituted for their benefit; Therefore, they have an inalienable and
indefeazible [sic] right to institute Government; and to alter, reform, and totally change
the same, when their safety, happiness, and the public good shall require it.
Quoted in K. HANSEN, srupra note 58, at 129. "But this passage was hardly intended to encourage
the principle ofpopular democracy, for, according to the political theory of the Kingdom of God,
sovereignty rested not with the people but in the hands of God." Id.
64. Id. at 130.
In territorial Utah the Council of Fifty ... was the policy-making body of the King-
dom of God. It was the body from which policies for the civil government of men on the
earth were to emanate. It was the policy-making body; the legislature of the State of
Deseret was the legislative agency required to put these policies into law...
Clark, supra note 57, at 141.
65. K. HANSEN, supra note 58, at 129-31; STORY OF L.D.S., supra note 53, at 253.
66. See K. HANSEN, supra note 58, at 126-30.
67. STORY OF L.D.S., supra note 53, at 253.
68. K. HANSEN, supra note 58, at 131.
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imposed capital punishment for the crime of murder.69 The code pre-
scribed the mode of execution: "Be it further ordained, that when any
person shall be found guilty of murder, under any of the preceding
sections of this ordinance, and sented [sic] to die, he, she or they shall
suffer death by being shot, hung or beheaded."70 Apparently, the court
determined the precise mode of execution.'
The provisions of the Deseret Assembly hardly took force before the
United States granted Utah territorial status. In 1852 the territorial leg-
islature enacted a more extensive criminal code, which adopted all the
laws of the provisional State of Deseret, including the capital punish-
ment measures,72 but also provided that the offender could choose the
mode of execution.7 3 First-degree murderers could "'suffer death by
being shot, hung, or beheaded, as the court may direct,' or as the con-
victed person may choose."'74 As it had done with the Deseret Assem-
bly, the Council of Fifty again orchestrated the election of the
territorial legislature, and members of the Council held at least twenty
of the thirty-nine seats. 75
The 1852 law governed capital punishment in the Territory of Utah
until 1876 when the legislature adopted a more complete criminal
code.76 The 1876 statute inadvertently repealed the section on modes
of execution without providing a new section, but the Utah courts con-
tinued to impose capital punishment by firing squad.77
In 1888 the legislature removed beheading as a method of state ex-
69. Section 1 of the Criminal Laws of the State of Deseret provided: "[I1f any person shall,
with premeditated intent, unlawfully kill a human being, in this State, they shall be deemed guilty
of murder, and on conviction of the same, before a court having jurisdiction thereof, shall suffer
death." LAWS & ORDINANCES OF THE STATE OF DESERET § I (Jan. 16, 1851).
70. Id. § 10.
71. "[Tlhe culprit shall suffer death, as the court may have directed." Id. § 11.
72. STORY OF L.D.S., supra note 53, at 258; Skidmore, supra note 55, at 161.
73. Skidmore, supra note 55, at 162.
74. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 132 (1878) (quoting 1852 Utah Laws).
75. The Council of Fifty ... organized the territorial government of Utah ....
.. [The Council] controlled key legislative committees.
Since church members followed the advice of the hierarchy in matters both spiritual
and temporal, the Council never had any difficulty in assuring election of its candidates.
Nominations were made by leading church authorities; absence of the secret ballot also
assured that only the most recalcitrant would dare oppose the official state.
K. HANSEN, supra note 58, at 136-37.
76. See Thomas & Jensen, supra note 54, at 58.
77. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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ecutions, but retained shooting and hanging.78 The present statute, vir-
tually identical to the 1888 measure, provides:
The punishment of death must be inflicted by hanging the defendant by
the neck until he is dead, or by shooting him, at his election. If the de-
fendant neglects or refuses to make election, the court at the time of mak-
ing the sentence must declare the mode and enter the same as a part of its
judgment.79
Whether by exercise of the defendant's option or by judicial imposi-
tion, shooting has been by far the predominant mode of execution in
Utah. 80
In short, present capital punishment law in Utah was shaped during
the territorial period. During this time the Mormon Church exerted
tremendous influence on Utah politics. Leading Saints made up the
territorial legislature,8 and the Council of Fifty was highly influential
in directing governmental affairs.82 Utah's territorial period also was a
time of stormy relations between the Saints and their Gentile (non-
Mormon) neighbors.83 Although a variety of factors contributed to the
strife,84 the heavy Mormon involvement in Utah politics was the exas-
78. 2 Comp. L. UTAH § 5131 (1888) provides:
The punishment of death must be inflicted by hanging the defendant by the neck until
he is dead, or by being shot, at his election. If the defendant neglects or refuses to make
the election, the court, at the time of rendering the sentence, must declare the mode and
enter the same as a part of its judgment.
79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-16 (1953).
80. Records indicate that only six offenders have been legally hanged in Utah, but thirty-
eight have been shot. There are no recorded beheadings. J. WALTERS, srupra note 46, at 73..
81. "Members of the legislature were usually Church leaders, elected by the people of the
various counties. In some ways they viewed their political responsibilities as an extension of their
church activity, for they were all engaged in building a political community conducive to the
success of the Kingdom." STORY OF L.D.S., supra note 53, at 262. See generally Melville, supra
note 57, at 46-53.
82. An examination of Utah territorial legislatures from 1851 to 1896 reveals that not
until the 1880's, when the influx of Gentiles into the territory in large numbers began to
crack Mormon political hegemony, did the Council of Fifty lose its political influence.
Throughout this period it controlled key legislative committees.
K. HANSEN, supra note 58, at 137. "Utah began as a territory with a government which was run
largely as a church operating through an informal but partially invisible Council of Fifty." La-
mar, Statehoodfor Utah.- A D(oerent Path, in MORMONISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE 127 (1972).
"The Mormons. . . simply elaborated their ecclesiastical machinery into a government," Id. at
129.
83. See L. ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM 291-322 (1958); K. HANSEN, supra note 58,
at 147-79; T. O'DEA, supra note 45, at 104-1I.
84. See STORY OF L.D.S., supra note 53, at 343; L. ARRINGTON, spra note 83, at 291-322
(economic tensions between Mormons and Gentiles); R. BURTON, THE CITY OF THE SAINTS 476-
93 (1963) (Mormon practice of polygamy as source of Mormon-Gentile strife).
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cerbating, if not the sole, reason for the early Mormon-Gentile con-
flict." To a lesser extent, religious tension remains a part of present
Utah society because of the perception that the Mormon Church has
remained unduly involved in state and local politics.8 6
1. Historical Purpose of Firing Squad Provision
Virtually nothing exists in the way of official legislative discussion of
the firing squad provision in Utah apart from the language of the law
itself; thus, an assessment of the purpose of the law and the motivation
of the legislators who enacted it must be drawn from circumstantial
evidence. The use of circumstantial evidence to assess legislative moti-
vation, however, is not necessarily a wild exercise in speculation. Dis-
cerning motivation by drawing inferences from legislative conduct, in
the context of antecedent and concurrent events and situations, is often
reasonably sound and is neither unknown to the law87 nor fraught with
special metaphysical difficulty." An inquiry into the motivation of the
lawmakers who first introduced the firing squad into Utah law suggests
that their purposes were significantly religious.
The Deseret Assembly, and later the territorial legislature, became
the first American lawmakers to adopt beheading and the firing squad
85. See K. HANSEN, supra note 58, at 147-79; T. O'DEA, supra note 45, at 104-11, 172; B.
ROBERTS, 5 A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY 372-81 (1957).
86. It is no secret that the Mormon Church wields tremendous political power in Utah. One
Utah writer has pointed out that although "clhurch leaders claim that they purposely exert wide
influence only on 'moral' issues . .. [tiheir definition of moral ... has been broad enough to
include [such things as] the Equal Rights Amendment .... " Jarvik, Probing the Power Struc-
ture, 5 UTAH HOLIDAY 4, 6 (May 24, 1976). The Church's opposition to the ERA ratification fight
has been a special source of tension between Mormons and non-Mormons in Utah. ERA support-
ers, primarily non-Mormons, accused the Church of sending its members to the Utah Womens
conference with instructions to vote against ratification and to use mob tactics. See Salt Lake
Tribune, June 29, 1972. However, conflicts are not limited to the ERA controversy. Other observ-
ers have noted tensions along religious lines because of Mormon influence in the Utah schools, in
dating relationships, in racial relations, and in local government. See generally Swenson,
Mormons and Gentiles, 6 UTAH HOLIDAY 6 (Nov. 8, 1976); see also STORY OF L.D.S., supra note
53, at 618-22; T. O'DEA, supra note 45, at 172.
87, See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968). Circumstantial evidence is
utilized in a variety of legal contexts to discern state of mind. In the criminal law, for example,
criminal intent is often found by drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence backward to the
state of mind of the actor. A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 214.
88. Inquiries into legislative motivation need not involve mysterious searches for the "sole,"
or "real," or even the "dominant" motive of the legislature. It is often fairly easy to determine
that illicit motivation played a "material role" in the legislative process however prevalent the
existence of legitimate motivation may also be. See Brest, supra note 1, at 119-24.
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as modes of execution. Except for a few aberrations during colonial
times, no American jurisdiction used beheading89 and Britain had ef-
fectively ceased its use more than one hundred years before the
Mormons adopted it in 1851.90 While shooting was an acceptable
mode for military executions, 91 hanging was the exclusive means of
state executions in other jurisdictions at the time the firing squad was
introduced into Utah law.92 In light of the fusion of church and state in
Utah, the most plausible explanation for the emergence of these meth-
ods in Utah is that they were intended to implement the late Prophet
Joseph Smith's desire to make beheading and shooting the law in order
to "spill the blood of the murderer on the ground" so that "smoke
thereof might ascend up to God."93 Brigham Young and the other
Mormon leaders in early Utah revered Joseph Smith. It is only natural
that when they took to the task of enacting capital punishment law, the
views of Joseph on the subject would heavily influence their thinking.94
Regardless of whether Joseph Smith's opinion on the religious ad-
89. See N. TEETERS, HANG BY THE NECK 95, 461 (1972); Bedau, General Introduction, in
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 21 (1972).
90. The last British execution by decapitation was in 1747. G. SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 179 (1950). Beheading was utilized on the European continent in the
1800's, J. LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 35-38 (1922), but there is little reason
to believe its use in Europe had anything to do with the Mormons employment of beheading in
early Utah.
91. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133-35 (1878).
92. See N. TEETERS, supra note 89, at 461; Bedau, supra note 89, at 21. The State of Nevada
is the only other state ever to have utilized the firing squad, but its employment of shooting arose
after Utah had adopted the method and lasted only briefly. See W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN
AMERICA 9 (1974).
93. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text. The conclusion that Joseph Smith's reli-
gious views on bloodspilling modes of execution directly led to Utah's capital punishment law is
further justified because George A. Smith, the person with whom Joseph Smith was debating
when Joseph expressed his views on the virtues of beheading and shooting, see text accompanying
note 40 supra, was the author of the first criminal code in Utah. Morgan, The Sate ofDererel, 8
UTAH HIsT. Q. 67, 108 (1940). Perhaps the debate with Joseph convinced George A. Smith of the
religious virtues of beheading and shooting as execution modes and thus explains why those
modes appeared in early Utah law.
94. Brigham Young and Heber C. Kimball stood staunchly by Joseph Smith even when other
Saints became disenchanted and called Smith a "fallen prophet." J.F. SMITH, ESSENTIALS IN
CHURCH HISTORY 198-99 (5th ed. 1935). Brigham Young once declared: "I honor and revere the
name of Joseph Smith. I delight to hear it; I love it. I love his doctrine." H. ANDRUS, JOSEPH
SMITH: THE MAN AND THE SEER 43 (1960). Brigham Young's dying words reportedly were,
"Joseph, Joseph, Joseph" Id. Mormon scripture reads: "Joseph Smith, the Prophet and Seer of
the Lord, has done more, save Jesus only, for the salvation of men in this world, than any other
man that ever lived in it." DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS § 135:3. The memory of Joseph Smith is
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vantages of bloodspilling modes of capital punishment directly shaped
Utah law, it is clear that the opinions of other prominent churchmen on
blood atonement did. Three of the most vigorous defenders of blood
atonement in early Utah, Brigham Young, Jedediah M. Grant, and
Heber C. Kimball,95 directly participated in the 1851 Deseret Assembly
that introduced beheading and the firing squad into Utah law. Young
approved the measure in his capacity as Governor of Deseret, and
Grant and Kimball were speakers of the Deseret house and senate, re-
spectively.96 Furthermore, the three were members of the Council of
Fifty.97 Minutes of secret meetings of the Council now available indi-
cate that the Council discussed the doctrine of blood atonement prior
to the adoption of the 1851 capital punishment law.98 Given the politi-
cal influence of the Council and its sympathy for blood atonement, it is
difficult to perceive the sudden and novel emergence of beheading and
the firing squad in the positive law of Utah as anything but a religious
phenomenon.
That the law included hanging as a mode of capital punishment and
permitted the offender to choose the method of execution in no way
diminishes the strength of the conclusion that the Assembly imple-
mented beheading and the firing squad to allow for the performance of
the blood atonement rite. The Mormons viewed hanging as a secular
method of imposing capital punishment, available to those who did not
choose to "atone" for their sins.99 The notion of individual freedom
was fundamental both to Mormon theology"° and to the Council of
perpetuated by a sizable body of Mormon hymns, poetry, and literature. See STORY OF L.D.S.,
supra note 53, at 198.
95. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
96. LAWS & ORDINANCES OF THE STATE OF DESERET § 31.
97. K. HANSEN, supra note 58, at 225.
98. For example, on March 3, 1849, the Council discussed the cases of Ira West and Thomas
Byres, who had committed crimes serious enough to arouse Brigham Young to say: "I want their
cursed heads to be cut off that they may atone for their sns, that mercy may have her claims upon
them in the day of redemption." On the following day the Council agreed that Ira West had
"forfeited his Head." Id. at 70.
99. Joseph Smith stated that he opposed hanging. See notes 40, 41 supra. Later Mormon
spokesmen expressed similar opinions: "[We do not believe in hanging. We think that if a man
sheds blood, his blood should be shed by execution." George Q. Cannon, quotedin J. WALTERS,
A STUDY OF EXECUTIONS IN UTAH 14 (1973); "The man who commits murder ... cannot receive
eternal life. . . . The only way to atone is to shed his blood. Hanging is not the proper method."
C. PENROSE, supra note 23, at 21.
100. Nothing in the Mormon conception of man is more in evidence or relates more im-
portantly to the total theological structure than the affirmation of the freedom of the will.
Nothing is permitted to compromise that freedom as the essential meaning of personal-
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Fifty's political theory."0' Forcing blood atonement upon the offender
thus would have been inconsistent with basic Mormon belief. Hanging
represented a secular alternative for offenders who, in the exercise of
their free agency, chose to reject a possible way to salvation from sin.
Beheading and the firing squad provided religious alternatives, 10 2 af-
fording the murderer the opportunity to pay for his offenses.
Numerous commentators agree with the thesis that the firing squad
exists in Utah law, at least historically, to effectuate blood atonement.
One Mormon historian in a discussion of blood atonement stated:
ity, whether human or divine, and at every turn of Mormon theological discussion the
fact of moral freedom and its implied moral responsibility must be met and accounted
for.... It is especially this commitment to the freedom of the will that conditions
Mormon theology against the concepts of human depravity, salvation by grace only,
divine election, the perserverance of the saints, and every form of predestinationism and
stands squarely against acceptance of the large measure of absolutism characteristic of
Christian theology.
S. MCMURRIN, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MORMON RELIGION 77-78 (1965).
101. "[lIn theory, the political kingdom of God was to be a pluralistic society that granted
wide latitude to the individual differences of its prospective members." K. HANSEN, supra note
58, at 37. "[The Mormons] substituted for [majority rule] a doctrine of individual rights that was
also ultimately grounded in natural law, but with the important qualifications that under its provi-
sions the individual did not have to bow to the will of the majority." Id. "The Kingdom of God
was to protect all peoples in their civil and religious rights, including the right to differ." Clark,
supra note 57, at 134.
102. Not all early Mormons thought of beheading and shooting in purely sectarian terms.
Some evidence of deterrence theory occasionally crept into discussions of capital punishment by
those methods.
[T]he best way to sanctify ourselves, and please God our Heavenly Father in these days
is to rid ourselves of every thief, and sanctify the people from every vile character. I
believe it is right; it is the law of our neighboring state to put the same thing in execution
upon men who violate the law, and trample upon the sacred rights of others. It would
have a tendency to place a terror on those who leave these parts, that may prove their
salvation when they see the heads of thieves taken off, or shot down before the public.
Hyde, Sanctiffcation-Econom).--potates-The Wolves and the Sheep, in 1 JOURNAL OF DIs-
COURSES 71, 73 (1854). It does seem, however, that the early Mormons primarily viewed capital
punishment in retributive terms as a means of expiating sin through shedding blood; hence, be-
heading and shooting were religiously significant, but hanging was not. Retributive elements are
also evident in the Mormon conception of legal punishment in general:
We believe that the commission of crime shouldbepunishedaccording to the criminality of
the offense, that murder, treason, robbery, theft, and the breach of the general peace, in
all respects, should be punished according to their criminality and their tendency to evil
among men, by the laws of that government in which the offense is committed; and for
the public peace and tranquility all men should step forward and use their ability in
bringing offenders against good laws to punishment. [Emphasis added].
DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 134:8. "The Mormons were firm believers in the Hebrew concept that
crimes were sins against God: the social attitude toward the criminal offender was that 'he should
willingly confess his crime and willingly expiate his wrong and then go forth with a repentant
heart."' Skidmore, Penology in Early Utah, 2 UTAH HUMANITIES REV. 145, 146 (1948).
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Latter-day Saints believe that where secular government prescribes capi-
tal punishment it is better that such form of execution be adopted as will
shed the blood of the criminal; hence in Utah, when the Latter-day Saints,
in their capacity as citizens of the state have made the laws, condemned
criminals, subject to capital punishment, are permitted to choose their
mode of execution either by being hung or shot, the latter mode, of
course, resulting in the shedding of their blood, thus meeting the require-
ment of the law of God as well as the law of the state.1
0 3
Another Mormon historian and doctrinal authority concludes that
Mormon legislators incorporated capital punishment provisions into
the laws of Utah to allow the offender to "have his blood shed in har-
mony with the law of God; and thus atone so far as it is in his power,
for the death of his victim."'1°4 Others agree that Utah's use of the
firing squad is rooted in the beliefs of early legislators in the doctrine of
blood atonement. 0 5
Whatever secular justifications might underpin the institution of cap-
ital punishment itself, religion provides a significant historical reason
and justification for the firing squad as a mode of execution. The hang-
ing provision in Utah law may well be a secular legislative response,
but the provision for the firing squad seems heavily motivated by sec-
tarian concerns. 1
2. Blood Atonement as a Contemporary Defense for Capital
Punishment
Even though modem Mormon leaders did not enthusiastically em-
brace the blood atonement doctrine and the recent Church statement
specifically rejects it, some Mormon citizens10 6 and government offi-
103. B. ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 129 n.41.
104. J. F. SMITH, supra note 48, at 136-37.
105. H. ANDRUS, JOSEPH SMITH AND WORLD GOVERNMENT 106-07 n.50 (1963). It would
appear that Bruce R. McConkie also believed that the firing squad was religiously significant in
Utah law. See B. MCCONKIE, supra note 48, at 93. McConkie has apparently reconsidered these
views, however. See McConkie Letter, supra note 47.
106. The following shows that blood atonement is still a part of the conciousness of some
modem Mormons who favor capital punishment:
Then blood atonement came up [in a discussion in a Mormon priesthood meeting]. It
frequently did in those years [1960"s1 when I discussed capital punishment with fellow
Mormons. Historians apologize for the doctrine. Few people claim to fully understand
it, but among Mormons I knew it was frequently used as a final argument in favor of the
death penalty.
One of the elders stated that certain sins, such as murder, could only be atoned for if
the offender voluntarily requested that his blood be shed. They correctly pointed out
that Utah is the only state in the union which gives a condemned man a choice as to
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cials 10 7 used the doctrine up to the time of the rejection as a justifica-
tion for capital punishment. Utah is still the only state to employ a
form of capital punishment that assures the shedding of the offender's
blood. Hanging, electrocution, lethal gas, or lethal injection-the
modes utilized in every other jurisdiction that imposes the death pen-
alty--do not entail bloodshed. As a consequence, blood atonement can
be practiced only in Utah before the firing squad. One author has spec-
ulated that the present Mormon-dominated Utah legislature would be
reluctant to adopt more humane methods of execution because offend-
ers would be induced to choose those new methods in lieu of the firing
squad and its potential for atonement.'0 8 While it is impossible to de-
termine the accuracy of that speculation, the Utah legislature recently
rejected a bill that would have provided death by "medical anesthesia"
as a third alternative to shooting and hanging for Utah capital offend-
ers.' °9 Shortly after the Utah legislature expressed its continued prefer-
ence for shooting and hanging, the legislature of the adjacent State of
Idaho adopted lethal injection as its sole means of execution.It° Legis-
lative concern in Utah for retaining a capital punishment scheme that
encourages blood atonement provides a plausible explanation for the
method of his execution. The firing squad spills blood. The other choice, hanging, does
not spill blood. They indicated that some of the more humane methods adopted by the
other states such as electrocution and gas do not shed blood, but since they would likely
be chosen over the bloodspilling firing squad, Utah has not adopted them. . . . There
has been only one hanging in Utah's recent history. It is a horrible way to die and is
rarely selected by those on death row. The condemned man was a Mormon. I have been
told by inmates and officers who knew him that his behavior often appeared to be an
active attempt to blacken his family name and shame his parents. He chose hanging as a
final defiant gesture, fully aware that he was not choosing the alternative that might
atone for his crime.
Wilcock, Utah'r Peculiar Death Penalty, 7 DIALOGUE 28, 32, 34 (1972).
[Within the context of the present national debate, many members of the [Mormon]
Church seem to remain surprisingly aloof. Rather than personally confront the numer-
ous moral and social dilemmas inextricably bound up in the question of capital punish-
ment, they prefer to rely on the so-called doctrine of blood atonement as the basis of
their position.
Hatch, Capital Punishment and Blood.4tonement, 2 SUNSTONE 90 (1977).
107. For an indication that blood atonement was a factor in the minds of those prosecuting
Gary Gilmore, see the interview with Deputy Attorney General Michael Deamer (on file at the
Utah Historical Society), at 48-51.
108. Under this theory, relatively more humane but bloodless methods such as the gas cham-
ber and lethal injection would be unappealing to Mormon legislators. See Wilcock, supra note
108, at 32.
109. See S. 333, 1977 Gen. Sess., Utah State Legislature, 31 UTAH SENATE J. 33 (Feb. 9, 1977).
110. Previously, hanging had been the mode of execution in Idaho. Salt Lake Tribune, Mar.
15, 1978, at 48, col. 1.
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radically different approaches of the neighboring Utah and Idaho legis-
latures with respect to the death penalty, especially because the Utah
rejection of medical anesthesia occurred prior to the official Mormon
rejection of blood atonement.
The legislative history of the statute defining the modes of execution
in Utah reveals no statement of secular purposes sought to be achieved
through either the firing squad or the option granted offenders of death
by hanging or firing squad. Neither do there appear to be any court
cases or statements of legislators, other governmental officials, or legal
commentators that explore the secular virtues of the Utah law. In the
absence of any secular purpose yet articulated to explain the unique
presence in Utah law of the option to choose a bloodspilling mode of
execution, religious factors best explain Utah's novel approach in effec-
tuating capital punishment.
If this analysis is correct, the firing squad retains present religious
significance to the extent that its current existence in Utah law is a con-
sequence of a historical legislative process, motivated significantly, it
appears, by sectarian concerns. But the present religious effects of the
firing squad are largely symbolic because of the recent Mormon dis-
claimer of blood atonement. Although for a time it appeared that Utah
law directly aided religion by providing a vehicle for the effectuation of
the blood atonement rite, that direct religious effect is lacking today.
Because the media has not widely publicized the Church statement dis-
avowing the doctrine, however, some people probably still perceive the
firing squad as a means of effectuating blood atonement. If so, reli-
gious considerations, albeit ones based on Church doctrine now offi-
cially disavowed, may still be operating as a justification for the firing
squad.
Given this doctrinal and historical background, the first amendment
issue posed by present Utah law may be stated: Is the provision for
shooting capital offenders, which had an initial legislative purpose of
providing a vehicle for effectuation of a consensual religious practice,
unconstitutional under the establishment clause even though the meas-
ure does not currently promote religious practice or directly aid reli-
gion?
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III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: VALUES, DOCTRINE AND CASES
The first amendment's religion provision, applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment,"' provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."112 Despite criticism from some commentators," 1
3
courts have developed separate strands of doctrinal theory under the
establishment and free exercise clauses. 114 The Supreme Court has
generally analyzed the distinction between the two clauses in terms of
whether the governmental action that touches on religion results in di-
rect or only indirect coercion upon individuals.
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not de-
pend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is vio-
lated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.
This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular
form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals.
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved reli-
gion is plain. But the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go
much further than that. Its first and most immediate purpose rested on
the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy gov-
ernment and to degrade religion." 5
Because there appears to be governmental support behind a particu-
lar religious belief in the case of the firing squad, establishment clause
problems exist." 6 Although free exercise infringements generally oc-
cur when a person or group suffers a meaningful violation of religious
111. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause applied to the states);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause applied to the states).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
113. See, e.g., Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE 142, 160-61, 178-79 (D. Oaks ed. 1963); Note, Toward a Un/form Valuation of the Religion
Guarantees, 80 YALE L.J. 77 (1970).
114. See Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationsho Between the "Establishment'and 'Free
Exercise' Clauses, 42 TEx. L. REV. 142, 146-47 (1963); Note, supra note 113.
115. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961), in which the Court describes a broader purpose for the establishment clause than
merely to insure protection of free exercise rights. "[T]he establishment of a religion was equally
feared [at the time of adopting the first amendment] because of its tendencies to political tyranny
and subversion of civil authority." Id. at 430 (footnote omitted).
116. R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 76 (1972). "[Ihe primary element in
the usual establishment case is that of favoring religion." Moore, supra note 114, at 150.
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liberty," 7 violations of the establishment clause require no showing of
actual harm because they threaten to upset the institutional balance of
religion and state." 8
A. Establishment Clause Values
Appeals to the history of the first amendment for guidance in imple-
menting the establishment clause are usually not helpful. Even though
the framers of the amendment could not have had today's problems in
mind when they drafted the religion clauses, 119 it appears that they
greatly differed among themselves over the meaning of the clauses.
Commentators have noted at least three distinct schools of thought that
influenced the drafters of the Bill of Rights. First, a pro-religious
movement, associated primarily with Roger Williams, saw separation
of church and state as a means of protecting organized religion from
the state.120 Government should foster a climate conducive to all reli-
gions.' 2 ' Thomas Jefferson and other Enlightenment thinkers of a de-
cidedly anticlerical bent held a different view, which advocated
separation to protect the state from religion.'2 2 Only the complete sep-
aration of religion from politics would eliminate the influence of reli-
gious institutions on political institutions and provide for a free choice
among political views.' 23 Third, James Madison saw separation of
church and state as a means to protect churches and government from
117. E. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 332 (1972).
118. "Establishment. . . appeared as an erosion of principle, a wrong without injury, or an
infraction technical and abstract in character." Note, supra note 113, at 82-83.
119. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). See also Gianella, Religious Libert;. Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development- Part II,
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 516-26 (1968).
120. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965).
121. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 817.
122. The Jeffersonian strand of first amendment history reflects the anticlerical bias of eight-
eenth-century rationalism, which was a significant factor in generating the establishment clause.
See Gorman, Problems of Church and State in the United States:. A Catholic View, in THE WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 41, 42-43 (D. Oakes ed. 1963). Jefferson's theory of strict separa-
tion of church and state is evidenced by his opposition to forced contributions to religion. "That
to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical." Quoted in C. ANTiEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREE-
DOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 33 (1964). The Jeffersonian tradition represents a distrust
of organized religion and a desire to keep the church from misusing the state as its instrument.
Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer From Separation to Detente in Church-State Relations, 55
N.C.L. REV. 563, 566 (1977).
123. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 817.
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each other.124 Madison believed that both religion and government
could best achieve their high purposes if each remained free of the
other within its respective sphere. 1
25
Although appeals to these somewhat conflicting historical views, all
of which were influential in precipitating the religion clauses, may not
be particularly fruitful in supplying answers to modem church-state
problems, it is possible to abstract from the traditions of Williams, Jef-
ferson, and Madison some broad principles that demonstrate the values
underlying the religion clauses. These values, in turn, facilitate analy-
sis of establishment clause problems.
The history of the religion clauses shows that religion has always
occupied an important place in American life. Religious liberty is still
a highly prized commodity. The protection of religious liberty, embod-
ied specifically in the free exercise clause, recognizes the value of allo-
cating religious choices to the realm of individual conscience,
unfettered by governmental coercion. 126 The free exercise clause is
thus a mandate of religious voluntarism.'27 If religious freedom is to
be meaningfully effectuated, it is necessary to prevent not only govern-
mental antagonism of religious belief, but also governmental prefer-
ence for it. The ideal of free competition of religious sects among
themselves and with irreligious elements is disrupted when government
provides either religious or irreligious promotion. 128 The realization of
religious autonomy requires substantial insulation of government from
religion. Thus, the value of religious voluntarism leads to a principle of
separation of church and state that precludes governmental involve-
ment in religious affairs. The principle of separatism not only pro-
motes the value of religious voluntarism, but also prevents religio-
politico dissension, the historic evil that the establishment clause was
meant to remedy, which often arises when religion and politics become
associated.' 29 Hence, the establishment clause is meant to complement
the free exercise clause in achieving the value of voluntarism through
the separation of church and state and in avoiding religio-politico
strife.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 818; Gianella, supra note 119, at 517.
127. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 818.
128. Id.
129. Gianella, supra note 119, at 517.
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B. Establishment Clause Doctrine-The Three-Prong Test
In an attempt to facilitate analysis of establishment problems, the
Supreme Court has developed a three-step standard, which is referred
to here as the "three-prong test." The test evolved from a series of
cases that concerned church-state problems in education; specifically,
cases of governmental financial aid to parochial schools 130 and cases of
religious exercises in public schools.' 31 This section will not attempt to
trace the development of the three-prong test. Others have undertaken
that analysis' 32 and the education cases are not particularly useful in
resolving the establishment issue posed by the firing squad. The Court
undoubtedly has been especially sensitive to the problems of support-
ing sectarian schools with public monies 133 and protecting impressiona-
ble school children from the evils of religious establishment.' 34
Moreover, most of the education cases-indeed, most establishment
cases in general-focus primarily on legislative effect rather than on
motivation and thus are of limited value for purposes of this article. It
is clear, however, that the three-prong test, the first prong of which fo-
cuses on legislative motivation, is the basic framework for analyzing
establishment clause cases in all factual areas. ' 3  Thus, the test is rele-
vant for analysis of the problem at hand.
1. The Secular-Purpose Prong
To withstand establishment clause attack, legislation that touches on
130. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
131. Abington School Dist. v, Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
132. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 850-61, 863-68
(1978); Nowak, The Supreme Court. The Religion Clauses and the Nationalization of Education, 70
Nw. U.L. REV. 883 (1976).
133. See Louisell, Does the Constitution Require a Purely Secular Society?, 26 CATH. U.L. REV.
20, 25 (1976); Nowak, supra note 132, at 889-9 1; Zoetewey, Excessive Entanglement: Development
of a Guidelinefor 4ssessing Acceptable Church-State Relationshifps, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 279, 311
(1976).
134. Education touches on a most sensitive area of church-state relations. "The judicial posi-
tion taken with respect to religious practices in public schools cannot be viewed in isolation from
policy considerations rooted in an understanding of the functions and values served by the public
school in a pluralistic society." P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 90 (1964).
135. See Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aftd without opinion, 419 U.S. 806
(1974).
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religion must possess a legitimate secular purpose. 36 The function of
the secular-purpose prong is to ascertain governmental purpose when it
is not clearly enunciated or to judge the credibility of purported pur-
poses. 137 Legislation enacted solely to promote religion is unconstitu-
tional. 31 Overtly religious legislation, however, is extremely rare.
Establishment clause analysis of legislative purpose usually arises in
statutory contexts that include both secular and religious aims. Apart
from occasional statements that merely "coincidental" advancements
of religion through secular legislation are not unconstitutional estab-
lishments of religion under the secular-purpose test, 139 the cases offer
no guidance in determining the constitutionality of legislation that pos-
sesses both secular and religious aims.
One commentator has offered some suggestions to assist with secu-
lar-purpose analysis, advocating a liberal construction of secular pur-
pose.
[Tihe definition of "secular" here must be a generous one: if a purpose
were to be classified as nonsecular simply because it coincided with the
beliefs of one religion or took its origin from another, virtually nothing
that government does would be acceptable; laws against murder, for ex-
ample, would be forbidden because they overlapped the fifth command-
ment of the Mosaic Decalogue. It is clear, then, that the definition of
religion that must be employed in finding a violation of the secular pur-
pose requirement should be: if something is "arguably nonreligious" it is
sufficiently secular.' 40
For these reasons, "the Court will usually find in the statutory language
or elsewhere a secular purpose for a challenged law, and will then
move on to consideration of the remaining [two prongs of the three-
prong test]."'' Moreover, judicial reluctance to strike down legislation
under the secular-purpose prong evidences the traditional objections to
inquiry into legislative motivation. Courts are hesitant "to challenge
another branch's judgment or good faith and engage in the difficult
process of unearthing hidden motives [if] that branch has formulated a
136. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 132, at 851.
137. Note, Establishment Clause Analysis fLegislative and.4dministrative 4id to Religion, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79 (1974).
138. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
139. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
140. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 835 (footnotes omitted). See also Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind.
471, 477-78, 306 N.E.2d 95, 101 (1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976).
141. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 836.
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secular purpose."' 142 Further, to invalidate laws simply because of reli-
gious motivation is futile and counterproductive if the effects of the
legislation are legitimately secular.
When a religiously motivated statute also has religious effects, it is
probably best, for the reasons above, to avoid strict scrutiny of motiva-
tion and focus constitutional attention on the effects of the measure.
But there will be instances-the Utah firing squad, for example-when
religiously motivated statutes will lack significant religious effect at the
time its constitutionality is questioned. In these cases, strict scrutiny of
motivation is appropriate. If so, the secular-purpose test requires sig-
nificantly more content than it presently enjoys to be an adequate ana-
lytic service.
2. The Primary-Effect Prong
The general inclination to focus on legislative effect rather than on
motivation is illustrated by the judicial tendency to admit secular pur-
pose but to scrutinize legislation closely under the primary-effect
test. 43 Under this test legislation that touches on religion must have a
primarily secular effect to withstand establishment clause challenge.44
If a law has the essential effect of promoting the pursuit of a religious
tradition or the expression of a religious belief, it violates the establish-
ment clause. 145
As with secular purpose, the judiciary has done little to clarify pri-
mary effect. The aid-to-education cases suggest that even if a measure
has the effect of promoting secular purposes, it is nevertheless unconsti-
tutional if it has the "direct and immediate" effect of advancing reli-
gion. 46 Although the "direct" and "immediate" criteria are themselves
vague, legislation apparently fails the primary-effect test if it directly
and immediately aids religion, regardless of whether the aid is a princi-
pal or even a substantial effect of the statute.'47 Likewise, there appears
to be no requirement that the religious effect outweigh the secular effect
142. Note, supra note 137, at 1179.
143. Id. at 1179-82.
144. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 132, at 851.
145. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 839.
146. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39
(1973).
147. Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 107, 120-21 (1974).
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if the religious aid is "direct."'' 48 Under this formulation, aid to reli-
gion is unconstitutional unless it is "indirect or incidental."'' 49
3. The Excessive-Entanglement Prong
The final prong, often characterized as a variation of the other two
prongs and not itself a separate standard,5 0 provides that government
must not be "excessively entangled" with religion.'' Avoiding exces-
sive governmental entanglement promotes the Madisonian concern for
minimizing contact between the spheres of church and state lest both
government and religion be corrupted. 52 Although Madison voiced
concern over two separate kinds of "entanglement"-political and ad-
ministrativet 53-for present purposes we need focus only on political
entanglement. Excessive entanglement of political forces with those of
religion threatens to engender political strife along religious lines. Po-
litical involvement with a single religious group, particularly with a
majority religion, is especially likely to result in ill-feeling among those
not of the majority sect. Thus, aid to a majority religion is especially
suspect under the excessive-entanglement prong, 54 for "the very sym-
bolism of conspicuous governmental aid to identifiably religious enter-
prise is regarded as an independent evil."' 155
The excessive-entanglement prong, like the secular-purpose and pri-
mary-effect prongs, is a nebulous standard. The prohibition against
excessive political entanglement with religion does embody a funda-
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See L. TaBE, supra note 4, at 865.
151. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 132, at 851.
152. Use of the excessive-entanglement criteria to avoid political-religious strife may be traced
to James Madison, who was especially concerned that the first amendment prevent political divi-
siveness among religious groups. See Kirby, supra note 122, at 571-73. For further discussion of
the "political strife" aspect of the establishment clause, see Fruend, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680, 1692 (1969); Nowak, supra note 132, at 906; Underwood, Permis-
sible Entanglement Under the Establishment Clause, 25 EMORY L.J. 17, 29 (1976); Zoetewey, supra
note 133, at 283. For the view that "strife avoidance" is not a separate constitutional value under-
lying the establishment clause, see Schwarz, No Imposition of Relgion." The Establishment Clause
Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 711 (1968).
153. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 866.
154. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794, 797-98.
"[G]overnmental preference of a particular religion . . . gives rise to an advantage which is
clearly inconsistent with voluntarism and will surely breed political dissension." Gianella, supra
note 119, at 517. Instances where a particular religion benefits from governmental aid probably
occur most often where a majority of voters are members of the benefited religion.
155. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 868.
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mental value that the establishment clause promotes-the avoidance of
political strife among religious sects-and to this extent it is analyti-
cally relevant. It is perhaps best used, however, not as a basis for inval-
idating statutes that offend its requirements, but as a basis for justifying
strict scrutiny of statutes under either the secular-purpose or primary-
effect tests.1- 6
C. McGowan, Epperson, and West
Although no Supreme Court cases directly speak to the firing squad
situation, two Court cases do address, more or less directly, the issue of
whether sectarian motivation is a sufficient ground for invalidating leg-
islation under the establishment clause. These cases, as well as a lower
court case from Maryland, are relevant in analyzing the establishment
clause issue raised by the Utah firing squad law.
In McGowan v. Maryland,'57 a 1961 case decided before develop-
ment of the three-prong test, the United States Supreme Court ex-
amined Maryland's Sunday Closing Law under the establishment
clause. The statute under consideration in McGowan generally pro-
scribed all labor, business, and other commercial activities on Sun-
day. 15 Seven employees of a discount store, who were convicted for
selling several inexpensive items on Sunday in violation of the statute,
argued that the purpose of the enforced labor stoppage on Sunday, the
Sabbath day for most Christians, was to facilitate and encourage
church worship by Christians and to induce non-Christians to join the
Christian faith.' 59 The employees supported their sectarian purpose ar-
guments by an appeal to the wording of the Maryland statute, earlier
versions of the law, and judicial constructions of the measure. They
further contended that even if secular purposes also existed for the stat-
ute, those purposes could be achieved in religiously neutral ways;' 60
thus the statute violated the establishment clause.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, sustained the stat-
ute through reasoning that clearly anticipated the three-prong analysis.
The Court focused primarily on the problem of sectarian motivation in
holding that although the legislation under consideration was religious
156. Id. at 866; Note, supra note 137, at 1189.
157. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
158. Id. at 422-25.
159. Id. at 431.
160. See id. at 449-50.
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in origin and had the present effect of benefiting some religious
groups, the current legislative purpose was to achieve the secular objec-
tive of providing a common day of rest and recreation.' 6' Although the
original versions of the statute were religious on their face, 62 and early
judicial opinions read them as religiously motivated, 63 a series of
amendments clearly evidenced the emergence of secular purposes for
the Sunday Closing Law. The amendments omitted much of the ex-
plicitly religious language,"6 and introduced for entertainment and
recreation businesses exemptions that were inconsistent with a thor-
oughly religious reading of the statute. Later judicial interpretations
recognized the secular evolution of the statutes from original protec-
tions of Sunday worship to present embodiments of legislative concern
for protecting the health and welfare of employees through provision
of a day of rest and relaxation. 65 The McGowan Court found that the
provisions permitting various sports and entertainments on Sunday
clearly manifested a legislative purpose of "providing a Sunday atmos-
phere of recreation, cheerfulness, repose and enjoyment."'' 66 Coupled
with the general proscription against other types of work, the statutory
"air of the day is one of relaxation rather than one of religion."'1 67
Moreover, a variety of nonreligious groups, including organized labor
and trade associations, supported similar statutes in other jurisdictions,
thus indicating the secular nature of modern Sunday Closing Laws. 61
The McGowan Court did not clearly define when statutes that pos-
sess both secular and religious purposes become essentially secular; it
161. Although the Court in McGowan spoke of the relevance of the religious effects of the
Maryland statute, id, at 442, 445, 449, 453, its analysis was primarily directed toward legislative
motivation rather than effect.
[I]n [McGowan] the Court introduced the idea . . . that whether a law constitutes an
establishment of religion or a denial of religious freedom is largely a function of whether
the legislature intended to aid or hinder religion. After an exhaustive search, the Court
found no illicit motivation to have underlain any of the Sunday laws before it. but
warned that if it ever did, its vengence would be swift.
Ely, supra note I, at 1209.
162. The predecessor of the Maryland statute was entitled "An Act Concerning Religion,"
which prohibited profaning "the Sabbath or Lord's day." Another ancestor of the Maryland stat-
ute was entitled "An Act for the Service of Almighty God and the Establishment of the Protestant
Religion within this Province." 366 U.S. at 446.
163. Id. at 446.47.
164. Id. at 448.
165. Id. at 449.
166. d. at 448.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 435.
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made no attempt to provide a judicial test for determining when these
statutes will withstand establishment clause attack. Although the Court
implied that these laws may sometimes be unconstitutional, 69 the only
guidance it offered for determining future cases was the statement that
statutes whose secular purpose "merely happens to coincide or harmo-
nize with the tenets of some or all religions" are not unconstitutional. 70
The Court easily found that the state had a legitimate interest in
mandating a day of rest and even in mandating the same day for all so
that "members of the family and community have the opportunity to
spend and enjoy together, a day on which there exists relative quiet and
disassociation from the everyday intensity of commercial activities, a
day on which people may visit friends and relatives who are not avail-
able during working days."'' But the question remained whether the
state was justified in choosing Sunday for the common day of rest if
religiously neutral days could achieve the secular purposes of the stat-
ute as effectively as Sunday. The Court answered this question by find-
ing that the state could not have chosen other means to achieve its
secular purposes that would have avoided support of religion. Most of
society considers Sunday a day of rest regardless of religion. 172 Sun-
day, therefore, is the most logical legislative choice for a common day
of rest.'73 The Court concluded that "[t]o say that the States cannot
prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes solely because cen-
turies ago such laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitu-
tional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of
mere separation of church and State."' 74 The Court, therefore, felt that
invalidation of the statute would promote no purpose underlying the
establishment clause and actually would be offensive to the public wel-
fare.
The Court left open, however, the possibility that Sunday Closing
169. See note 175 infra and accompanying text.
170. 366 U.S. at 442.
171. Id. at 450.
172. Id. at 451-52.
173. The Court permitted the government to select Sunday as the common day of rest
precisely because it is the common Sabbath of the majority. The Court allowed this
selection, not in order to advance the observance of the Sabbath, but in order to choose
the day most suitable for secular purposes of rest and recreation in the eyes of the major-
ity.
Gianella, supra note 119, at 532.
174. 366 U.S. at 445.
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Laws in other contexts may be unconstitutional under the establish-
ment clause.
[W]e should make clear that this case deals only with the constitutionality
of. . .the Maryland statute before us. We do not hold that Sunday legis-
lation may not be a violation of the 'Establishment' Clause if it can be
demonstrated that its purpose--evidenced either on the face of the legisla-
tion, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative effect-
is to use the State's coercive power to aid religion. 175
In a 1968 case, pperson v. Arkansas,76 the Supreme Court again
focused on the problem of sectarian motivation when it considered the
constitutionality of an obscure and largely dormant Arkansas law that
prohibited the teaching in public schools of the theory that man
evolved from other species of life. 177 This time the Court invalidated
the measure, explicitly resting its holding upon the conclusion that the
law had been passed with the intent to promote fundamentalist Christi-
anity.178 While the statute did not promote religion on its face, the
Court relied on a variety of circumstantial evidence to find sectarian
motivation. Newspaper advertisements published during the time the
legislature debated the bill explicitly urged believers in the Bible to
support the measure as a vote against "atheistic evolution."' 79 Letters
to the editors of newspapers expressed fear that teaching evolution
would "subvert Christianity."'' s0 Moreover, the legislature passed the
statute immediately after the famous Scopes trial had tested Tennes-
see's law that made it unlawful "to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach
175. Id. at 453.
176. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
177. At the time Epperson reached the Supreme Court, the state had not attempted to enforce
the anti-evolution statute. Id. at 109 (Black, J., concurring). Moreover, there seemed little likeli-
hood that the Epperson plaintiffs would suffer harm through application of the statute. One plain-
tiff, Susan Epperson, was a teacher in the Arkansas system when she brought the action against
the statute. When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, she was rumored to have left her
teaching job and moved, perhaps out of the State of Arkansas entirely. Id. at 110 (Black, J.,
concurring). The other plaintiff was a parent who wanted his children to be taught evolutionary
theory. Justice Black speculated that the children had probably been so taught and that in any
event they had likely finished high school by the time Epperson reached the Court, rendering moot
any claim they may have had. Id.
178. Id. at 103. Commentators view Epperson as an establishment clause case in which the
Supreme Court invalidated legislation solely because of illicit motivation, as opposed to effect.
See Ely, supra note 1, at 1318.
179. 393 U.S. at 107-08.
180. Id.
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instead that man has descended from a lower order of animals."' 8'
The Epperson Court easily found that the Arkansas law was motivated
for the same reasons as the explicitly religious Tennessee law.' 82 Un-
like the statute in McGowan, the legislature had never amended the
Arkansas statute since its initial passage in 1928.
The Court found in the record no "suggestion. ..[that] the Arkan-
sas law [could] be justified by considerations of state policy other than
[a desire to support] the religious views of some of its citizens,"' 83 and
thus held the statute invalid. Mr. Justice Black, who concurred on
other grounds, argued that the majority had chosen to see a nonsecular
purpose when it could have easily read the statute as an attempt by the
state "to withdraw from its curriculum any subject deemed too emo-
tional and controversial for the public schools."' 84 Furthermore, Jus-
tice Black saw possible free exercise problems if the state was precluded
from eliminating what many viewed as an anti-religious doctrine from
the schools. "If the theory [of evolution] is considered anti-religious, as
the Court indicates, how can the State be bound by the Federal Consti-
tution to permit its teachers to advocate such an 'anti-religious' doc-
trine to school children?"'' 85
The Court intimated that the effects of the Arkansas statute favored
religious interests. 86 Clearly, however, the Court based its opinion on
religious motivation, not effect. 187 It relied on the principle of separa-
tism as the establishment value threatened by the Arkansas law. "Gov-
ernment in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile
to any religion. . . and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion
• . .against another or even against the militant opposite."' 88 The
Court concluded that the first amendment "mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion."'189
In reaching its decision, the Court did not cite McGowan. Instead, it
181. Id. at 108-09.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 107.
184. Id. at 113.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 104, 106.
187. See Ely, supra note 1, at 1318.
188. 393 U.S. at 103-04.
189. Id. at 104.
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relied entirely on cases in the area of education, some of which did not
consider establishment issues.'90 The Court intimated that the Epper-
son holding might be limited to the educational context. In quoting
previous cases, the Court noted that "[t]he vigilant protection of consti-
tutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools. . . .[The first amendment] does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."'' Because the Court
held the statute unconstitutional solely as a result of its sectarian moti-
vation, it did not discuss how or even whether the failure to teach evo-
lutionary theory had the consequence of "casting a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom." Furthermore, because the parties bringing the ac-
tion sought to have the statute declared unconstitutional for reasons
essentially educational and not religious in nature, Epperson may be of
limited precedential value in noneducational contexts. Susan Epper-
son, an Arkansas teacher, attacked the statute because her school re-
quired that she use a book with a chapter on evolutionary theory,
which she feared might trigger personal liability under the statute. A
parent, whose reason for attacking the statute stemmed from his desire
that his children be informed of all scientific theories, joined her in the
action. 92 Hence, while Epperson clearly relied on establishment clause
analysis, it is not clear from the opinion whether the Court envisioned
the primary evil of the Arkansas statute in terms of its religious intru-
sion into government or its inhibition of academic freedom.
One should note a final case before turning to a legal analysis of the
firing squad. While lacking the Supreme Court authority of McGowan
and Epperson, the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
in State v. West 93 is useful. In West, decided in 1970, the court struck
down the religiously motivated Maryland blasphemy statute because it
lacked secular purpose in violation of the establishment clause. The
statute was religious on its face, prohibiting blasphemy against "God,"
"Jesus Christ," or the "Trinity."' 94 Appeals to the historical origins of
the statute convinced the court that the purpose of the measure was to
190. The Court cited due process cases dealing with restrictions on academic freedom. Id. at
105 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923)).
191. 393 U.S. at 104-05. The Court also stated that "ft]here is . . no doubt that the First
Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." Id. at 106.
192. Id. at 110; see note 177 supra.
193. 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602 (Ct. Spec. App. 1970).
194. The statute provided inter alia: "If any person, by writing or speaking, shall blaspheme or
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"preserve the sanctity of the Christian religion."' 95 Apart from some
minor amendments that altered only the penalty for blasphemy, the
statute had remained in essentially the same form from its inception to
the present. 96
The parties conceded the religious origins of the statute, but the State
urged that the statute had assumed "a secular aura and may be sus-
tained as an effort by the State to enable 'those citizens who desire to
worship to carry on unmolested' and, additionally, as an effort to avoid
the endangerment of public peace by persons who are incensed or out-
raged by the blasphemous utterances proscribed by the statute." 197 The
court responded:
It is apparent. . . from a literal reading of the statute and when consid-
ered in its historical setting, that there has not been and could not be, short
of legislative action, any infusion of a secular purpose into the statute in
its present form. The statute does not purport to relate the blasphemous
utterances therein proscribed to the prevention or breaches of the public
peace or to enabling persons of the Christian or other faiths to worship
unmolested, or to preserve the orderliness of our society. It plainly and
unequivocally makes it a crime for any person to blaspheme or curse God
.* ,The setting or circumstances in which the. . .[blasphemy] occurs
is unrestricted. [The statute] simply and categorically proscribes such ut-
terances under any and all circumstances.' 98
Thus, the court apparently recognized that secular purposes may in-
deed be infused to save a statute from establishment attack, but until
the legislature specifies these purposes in the text of the law itself, the
statute cannot stand.
The West court referred to McGowan and Epperson only ob-
liquely,' 99 but did utilize the secular-purpose prong as a basis for its
decision .2 1 The court cited the principle of separatism as the establish-
ment value offended in West. "When the power, prestige, and support
of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, there inev-
itably occurs a breach of the 'wall of separation' which, according to
Thomas Jefferson, the framers of the First Amendment intended to
curse God, or shall write or utter any profane words of and concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ,
or of and concerning the Trinity... he shall on conviction be fined." Id. at 272, 263 A.2d at 603.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 275, 263 A.2d at 604.
198. Id. at 275-76, 263 A.2d at 604-05 (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 274, 263 A.2d at 604.
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erect and forever maintain between Church and State." 20'
IV. SECTARIAN MOTIVATION AS A BASIS FOR RENDERING THE
FIRING SQUAD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Epperson and West sustain the claim that sectarian motivation may
be a sufficient condition for invalidating legislation under the establish-
ment clause. The cases do not, however, explicitly define the condi-
tions under which invalidation should occur. Clearly, a doctrine that
mandates invalidation whenever sectarian motivation can be docu-
mented is too broad. That view would hold any law overlapping the
Mosaic Decalogue unconstitutional. In addition, invalidation because
of religious motivation per se would seem to deny religious groups the
opportunity to voice their opinions on important social issues.202
Moreover, if the religious beliefs of lobbyists and the intensity of their
activity were the sole determinants of constitutionality, "there would
be a serious danger of manipulative efforts, with various religious
groups feeling impelled or enticed by the test either to conceal or to
feign interest in an area of legislative activity or inaction. '203
This part of the article develops a framework for determining when
201. Id. For a discussion of blasphemy laws in a variety of legal contexts, see Note, Blas-
phemy, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 694 (1970). See also 41 A.LR3d 519 (1972). The legal significance of
the West case is uncertain. Some courts have cited it approvingly. See, e.g., Webb v. Lake Mills
Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 802 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (court suggests in dicta that
state regulation of "profanity" may run afoul of the establishment clause under West). There are,
however, decisions that may call West into question. Courts have rejected establishment clause
challenges to various other criminal statutes that defined offenses originally religious in nature. In
State v. Saunders, 130 NJ. Super. 234, 326 A.2d 84 (1974), rev'don otherground, 75 N.J. 200, 381
A.2d 333 (1977), the court upheld the New Jersey fornication statute under establishment clause
attack. The court conceded the religious origins of the statute, but found that its present purposes
were to promote the "compelling" secular purposes of preventing illegitimate births, and the
spread of venereal disease. Id at 244, 326 A.2d at 89. The Saunders court cited neither West,
McGowan, nor Epperson. Likewise, the court in Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205 (D.C.
1976), upheld the D.C. sodomy statute, finding that although religious forces motivated original
sodomy laws, these laws presently reflect the legitimate secular purpose of promoting public de-
cency. Id at 1208-09. The attackers appealed to McGowan for support. See also Conner v. State,
253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114 (1973) (sodomy statutes upheld under establishment clause attack);
People v. Baldwin, 37 Cal. App. 3d 385, 112 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1974); Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471,
306 N.E.2d 95 (1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976) (prostitution statute upheld against estab-
lishment clause challenge because virtually all criminal laws are the progeny of Judaeo-Christian
ethics).
202. See Choper, supra note 14, at 273.
203. Tribe, supra note 4, at 24.
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sectarian motivation should be a sufficient condition for invalidating
legislation under the establishment clause. The test is generated
through the process of assessing the constitutionality of the Utah firing
squad. This discussion demonstrates that although the existence of the
firing squad in Utah law produces little present religious effect and may
well be supported by legitimate secular purposes, good reasons never-
theless exist for invalidating the firing squad simply because of its reli-
gious origins. Thus, if the Utah firing squad is indeed unconstitutional,
it represents a purer example of invalid sectarian motivation than do
Epperson and West in which the religiously motivated legislation also
had the effect of promoting present religious interests. The firing squad
law thus may be a paradigmatic instance of religiously motivated legis-
lation that is unconstitutional simply because of its sectarian origins. If
so, analysis of this paradigm should provide guidance in constructing a
general theory of sectarian motivation as sufficient justification for leg-
islative invalidation under the establishment clause.
A. The Firing Squad and the Three-Prong Test
As mentioned earlier, analysis of any establishment problem should
begin, although seldom will it end, with a consideration of the three-
prong test. For present purposes, this essentially entails an analysis
under the secular-purpose prong. Before discussing whether the firing
squad has sufficient secular purpose, however, some attention must be
paid to the primary-effect and excessive-entanglement prongs as they
relate to the Utah law.
The firing squad probably would be constitutional under the pri-
mary-effect test. Because the Mormon Church has now disavowed
blood atonement, the firing squad has decreased in religious import.
Thus, it is difficult to argue that Utah's continued use of that mode of
execution "directly and immediately" advances religion under the pri-
mary-effect rubric. The cases that have invalidated legislation under
this rubric involved statutes that advanced present religious interests,
doctrines, or practices. 2°4 Although the Utah firing squad may be relig-
iously significant as a symbol of past promotions of religion by the
State, its present religious effect probably is not sufficient to constitute a
"direct and immediate" advancement of religion.
204. See, ag.. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Although the firing squad probably would survive constitutional
scrutiny under the primary-effect test, its potential to engender political
strife along religious lines might raise constitutional questions under
the excessive-entanglement prong. The issue of capital punishment it-
self is an extremely controversial matter about which members on both
sides of the controversy have strong feelings. Widespread knowledge
that Utah's capital punishment law was originally justified by the reli-
gious beliefs of Mormon legislators205 would almost certainly antago-
nize non-Mormons who favor the abolition of capital punishment. If
historical religious involvement in secular law poses the potential of
exacerbating present tensions over the issue of capital punishment by
creating animosity between Mormons and Gentile abolitionists, then
the firing squad would be highly suspect under the excessive-entangle-
ment prong. This is especially true in light of the past history of Mor-
mon-Gentile strife and the great potential for religio-politico conflict in
a context such as Utah where a majority religion has become involved
in politics. Although the firing squad may constitute "excessive entan-
glement" of religion in government, however, it does not follow that
the firing squad is necessarily unconstitutional. The potential for re-
ligio-politico conflict provides a basis for justifying strict scrutiny under
the secular-purpose test,20 6 but this potential is not a necessary condi-
tion for strict scrutiny because independent reasons exist for use of this
standard whenever clear and convincing evidence of significant sectar-
ian motivation is shown. 20 7
Analysis under the secular-purpose test requires courts to ascertain
governmental purposes where, as in the case of the Utah firing squad,
no secular purposes have been articulated by the legislature.20 8 Two
formulations of secular-purpose issues arise with respect to the Utah
statute. One issue focuses on the constitutionality of the firing squad as
the religious component of a law that also embodies a secular compo-
nent and allows the offender to choose between the two. On this view
of the problem, the establishment clause issue depends on the secular
purpose of the option to choose between religiously significant and re-
205. This historical information is not widely known; this article is one of the only attempts
thus far to document and trace the religious underpinnings of the firing squad. See also J. WAT-
TERS, suipra note 21.
206. See L. TIBE, supra note 4, at 866-68.
207. See notes 229-33, 246-47 infra and accompanying text.
208. See Note, supra note 137, at 1178-79.
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ligiously neutral execution modes, not on the secular justification of the
religiously significant mode itself. If the option, given its religious con-
notation, lacks secular justification, it follows from Epperson that the
option violates the establishment clause; the state could only use the
religiously neutral mode of execution, hanging. But the firing squad
probleni also raises an issue that focuses on the secular justifications for
the firing squad apart from its place as a religious component in a
model that permits choice between religious and secular modes. Practi-
cally speaking, the firing squad has become the sole mode of execution
in Utah because it is the overwhelming choice of offenders and the
mode judicially imposed when offenders fail to exercise their option.2"9
Thus, if the firing squad is, in effect, the sole execution mode in Utah,
can secular purposes justify that mode, apart from its role as an ele-
ment in the option apparatus?
Because the state has not articulated secular purposes for either the
firing squad-hanging option or the use of the firing squad itself, secu-
lar-purpose analysis of these issues requires speculation about any such
purposes to justify the law.
Only one justification appears plausible for providing capital offend-
ers the choice of execution mode: the option affords a modicum of
dignity to offenders by respecting their choices on the method of death.
The 1888 enactment, which deleted beheading, a particularly gross
form of execution, from the available choices, lends credence to the
claim that the option provision reflects humanitarian concern for the
offender, although the legislative history provides no evidence of this
rationale.
Although this justification is plausible,210 especially in the 1850's
before the states developed more humane modes of execution, the reli-
gious theory probably accounts more adequately for the origins of the
option. Moreover, attempts to support the present option as a conces-
sion to human dignity are unconvincing. Hanging and shooting are the
two most barbarous modes of execution employed in any American
jurisdiction."' To provide a choice between even the most humane
modes of death is no doubt a small concession to human dignity, but an
option between only the most primitive modes at best places the of-
209. See note 80 supra.
210. See Gardner, supra note 18, at 110-18.
211. Id. at 118-29. See also J. KERVOKIAN, MEDICAL RESEARCH AND THE DEATH PENALTY
15-16 (1960).
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fender between a rock and a hard place, and at least insults rather than
respects the humanity of the offender. Moreover, the Utah legislature's
recent rejection of medical anesthesia as a third option, 212 arguably a
more humane mode of execution than either hanging or shooting,213 is
inconsistent with the view that the present hanging-firing squad option
serves for humanitarian purposes.
If one cannot explain the option as an attempt to inject humanitarian
concerns into the execution process, it seems that no secular purpose
presently supports the option. Given the religious significance of the
option, its existence in Utah law is best understood as a remnant of past
attempts to promote religious doctrine through secular law. Lacking in
secular purpose, the firing squad-hanging option, like the anti-evolu-
tion statute in Epperson and the blasphemy statute in West, seems un-
constitutional. Thus, the courts should invalidate the religious
component of the option-the firing squad. There is a caveat, however;
because the principle of voluntarism is the most fundamental establish-
ment value, one should not make a decision of unconstitutionality
under the establishment clause without considering the possible effects
of that decision on religious freedom. Any establishment clause deci-
sion that is detrimental to the free exercise of religion is suspect. This
article will later consider in detail the free exercise ramifications of in-
validating the firing squad under the establishment clause.214
From the above discussion, one can extract a general principle that is
applicable to other cases: Clear and convincing evidence215 of signifi-
cant sectarian legislative motivation216 is a sufficient condition for in-
validating legislation if no secular legislative purpose exists, or if
purported secular purposes merely attempt to rationalize illicit motiva-
tion, provided that no significant violations of religious liberty result
from the invalidation.
This analysis of the execution option and its facile conclusion of the
212. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
213. See Gardner, note 18 supra, at 128-29.
214. See notes 258-78 infra and accompanying text.
215. The standard of "clear and convincing" evidence, although somewhat arbitrary, seems
proper to accommodate the competing interests involved in analyzing sectarian motivation under
the establishment clause. See Brest, supra note 1, at 130 n.171.
216. Evidence of only "insignificant" secular purpose should not be a sufficient basis for inval.
idating legislation under the establishment clause. Evidence is "significant" if it demonstrates that
secular purpose played a nontrivial part in the legislative decisionmaking process and might have
affected the outcome. Id. at 119.
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unconstitutionality of the firing squad, however, may fail to address the
real issue. It is perhaps misguided to focus on the firing squad in its
relationship to hanging when the first amendment issue arises initially
because of the presence of the firing squad, not the firing squad-hang-
ing option, in Utah law. Thus, one may view the firing squad itself as
the proper subject of constitutional attention. If the firing squad is to
fall, perhaps it should be because it, and not the option, is without suffi-
cient secular underpinning. One may frame the issue, then, under the
secular-purpose test in terms of whether adequate secular purpose sup-
ports the firing squad itself.
This latter formulation of the issue raises interesting and difficult es-
tablishment problems. The issue is difficult because one may posit a
variety of legitimate secular purposes to support the firing squad as a
mode of execution. It is arguably a penologically effective, efficient,
economical, and relatively dignified method of satisfying the legitimate
state interests that capital punishment is thought to promote. Because
the firing squad seems to possess both historical religious purposes and
present secular purposes, it thus raises an establishment clause issue
that courts and commentators have not extensively explored.
B. The Firing Squad and the Establishment Case Law
McGowan is clearly the most helpful case for examining problems of
legislation motivated by both secular and religious aims. It thus will be
extensively compared with the case at hand. Before looking at Mc-
Gowan, however, Epperson and West must be related to the firing
squad problem.
Epperson is of minimal value in assessing the constitutionality of the
firing squad because the Court found no evidence of secular purpose to
support the Arkansas statute. Epperson is important, however, in es-
tablishing the propriety of appeals to circumstantial evidence to derive
sectarian motivation for a statute religiously neutral on its face. Hence,
the process of discerning sectarian motivation used in this article seems
justified in light of Epperson, assuming, of course, that Epperson can be
extended to noneducational contexts. The Court did not specify the
quantum of evidence necessary to establish sectarian motivation in any
context, but presumably it might be lower in a case like Epperson in
which secular purpose is lacking than it would be in the case of the
firing squad in which secular purposes arguably exist. The Epperson
Court, however, felt that scrutiny of legislative motivation was neces-
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sary to maintain the principle of separatism. That the Court consid-
ered such scrutiny necessary in the case of an obscure and largely
dormant Arkansas law shows that establishment challenges often rep-
resent matters of lofty principle that are more symbolic than real in
their effects. 2 17 Thus, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the issue of
the Utah firing squad also represents an important matter of principle
worthy of judicial attention.
The West case appears more useful in analyzing the firing squad.
The facts of West parallel the Utah situation quite closely. Both cases
concern religiously motivated statutes that arguably have lost much of
their historical sectarian flavor and have come to embody legitimate
secular purposes. Neither legislature amended its statute to any signifi-
cant extent from the time of its original adoption. Both cases concern
statutes void of explicit statements of secular purpose either on the face
of the statute or through legislative history. Both cases concern statutes
that promote particular religious interests. The blasphemy statute in
West imposed secular punishment for a sin against the Christian reli-
gion; the Utah firing squad statute imposes a form of ecclesiastical pun-
ishment through the secular law of the state. But a key difference
between the two cases precludes West's applicability to the problem at
hand. It is possible to imagine secular purposes to uphold the firing
squad statute because the Utah law is religiously neutral on its face.
The West blasphemy statute on its face, in contrast, blatantly supported
a religious view and prohibited blasphemy in all contexts, not just those
where the blasphemous utterances threatened secular interests of public
peace and quiet religious worship. The West court found it impossible
to conclude that secular purposes justified the law in its present form.
Thus, the statute in West resembles the statute in Epperson-a solely
religious measure with no possible secular justification.
Unlike Epperson and West, McGowan deals with a statute that pos-
sesses both religious and secular purposes. McGowan thus provides in-
sights into when such statutes may withstand constitutional scrutiny
under the establishment clause. It is clear from McGowan that some
statutes enacted initially to promote religious interests may become suf-
ficiently secular to withstand establishment attack. When evidence of
secular purpose, inconsistent with original religious purposes, emerges
through legislative amendment and judicial interpretation, the secular
217. See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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purpose becomes predominate over the original religious purpose. 218
The McGowan Court determined that the statutory amendments
showed a clear legislative intent to secularize the statute. In addition,
the secularization was inconsistent with the original religious intent.
The amendments, which exempted entertainment and recreation busi-
nesses from the Sunday Closing Law, encouraged people to spend "the
Sabbath" at the beach or at the ballpark, rather than at church. The
"air of the day" had become one of relaxation rather than religious
piety.219 Thus, the clear evidence of a secularization process, coupled
with the emergence of secular purposes inconsistent with earlier reli-
gious purposes, protected the statute from establishment attack. That
the secular purposes could not be achieved in religiously neutral ways
only fortified this conclusion.
None of this reasoning is applicable to the Utah situation. Unlike
the statute in McGowan, the Utah statute has remained virtually un-
changed from its inception. There is no evidence of the kind of secular-
ization process that occurred with the Maryland Sunday Closing Law.
Moreover, unlike the situation in McGowan, the secular purposes that
one may posit for the Utah measure are not inconsistent with the his-
torical religious purposes of the statute. It is perfectly possible to ra-
tionalize the firing squad as an efficient, economical, and humane way
of executing capital offenders, as well as a means of effectuating the
blood atonement rite. It is not as possible to justify the Maryland stat-
ute as a measure intended to get people into church by making beaches
available to them. There is thus no reason, using the McGowan ration-
ale, to conclude that the secular purposes of the firing squad, whatever
they may be, have come to predominate over the original religious pur-
poses. Furthermore, McGowan's reasoning, which argues that laws
possessing both religious and secular purposes should be upheld from
establishment attack if the secular purpose cannot reasonably be
achieved in a religiously neutral way, does not require a finding that
the firing squad is constitutional. Religiously neutral alternatives are
available to achieve the secular purposes that the firing squad pro-
motes.
There are several objectives that guide the manner in which capital
punishment should be administered: general deterrence, retribution,
218. See Ely, supra note 1, at 1325.
219. Id. at n.374.
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and concerns for humane, efficient, and economical modes of execu-
tion.220 There is no reason to suppose that the firing squad is a more
effective deterrent than any other method of capital punishment. The
Utah capital offenders' overwhelming choice of the firing squad over
hanging221 indicates that death by shooting generates no special fear
that might make the firing squad a more effective deterrent than death
by other execution modes.222 Even if the firing squad were a particu-
larly dreadful way to die, the Utah scheme permits the offender to
choose the gallows. Furthermore, because Utah's use of the firing
squad may actually encourage certain offenders to commit capital of-
fenses in that state, the firing squad may be a less effective deterrent
than other modes of capital punishment. Some individuals commit
capital offenses in hopes of being executed. 223 Because the thrill and
notoriety surrounding a violent mode of execution appeals to these of-
fenders,224 death in a blaze of rifle fire may be particularly attractive.22
Likewise, there is no reason to favor the firing squad over other
modes of execution to serve secular retribution policies. Considera-
220. A variety of considerations underly the imposition of the criminal sanction. The theoreti-
cal bases of punishment are generally thought to be incapacitation of dangerous offenders, reha-
bilitation, special deterrence, general deterrence, and retribution. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,
CRIMINAL LAW 21-25 (1972). The concern over incapacitating dangerous criminals is alleviated
no matter what method of execution the state employs. The goals of rehabilitation and special
deterrence, important in understanding punishment in other contexts, are irrelevant in assessing
the value of various ways to execute offenders.
The firing squad does not seem to represent a more efficient or humane mode of execution than
those methods used in other jurisdictions. In fact, it may be less efficient. Even the Royal Com-
mission on Capital Punishment did not consider the firing squad as a serious alternative to hang-
ing: "The firing squad is open to obvious objections as a standard method of civil execution: it
needs a multiplicity of executioners and does not possess even the first requisite of an efficient
method, the certainty of causing immediate death." ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT, 1949-53 REPORT CMD. No. 8932, at 249 (1949-1953). There are reported instances of Utah
firing squad marksmen missing their target or only wounding the offender who painfully awaited
death as the marksman reloaded for a second execution try. Gardner, supra note 18, at 124.
221. See note 80 supra.
222. To the extent that capital punishment deters, it is probably a product of the fear of death
itself and not of the method used to accomplish it. The fear of death is universal, whether caused
by disease, the firing squad, or the gas chamber. See E. KUBLER-ROss, ON DEATH AND DYING 5
(1969).
223. Incitement of capital crimes by the existence of capital punishment is referred to as the
"suicide-murder syndrome." Bedau, 27e Case Against the Death Penalty, in VoicEs AGAINST
DEATH 301, 304 (P. Mackey ed. 1976). See also J. KERVOKIAN, supra note 211, at 44.
224. See J. KERVOKIAN, supra note 211, at 44.
225. Some have speculated that Gary Gilmore committed his crimes in Utah so that he might
die in a "blaze of rifle fire" that would transform him into a kind of hero. See H. BEDAU, supra
note 15, at 121.
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tions of justice set rough boundaries of proportionality between offense
and punishment, but do virtually nothing to establish the form that the
punishment should take.226 Even defenders of the lex talionis variety
of retribution seem unconcerned about whether one method of execut-
ing an individual murderer or class of murderers is more just than an-
other.227
Finally,the offenders' option to choose between hanging or the firing
squad refutes arguments that the firing squad is necessary because it is
more humane, more efficient, or less costly than other methods. If the
firing squad did possess these virtues, certainly the Utah legislature
would have made it the state's sole execution mode.
All in all, religiously neutral alternatives such as hanging or the gas
chamber achieve the secular goals of capital punishment at least as ef-
fectively as shooting. Utah thus does not need to use the firing squad to
effectuate a secular capital punishment policy. Although McGowan is
not authority for the conclusion that the firing squad is unconstitutional
because religiously neutral alternatives could achieve the secular goals
of capital punishment at least as effectively as shooting, it does leave
open the possibility that a statute will be found unconstitutional if its
"purpose-evidenced ... in conjunction with its legislative history
. ..is to use the State's coercive power to aid religion."228 Thus, Mc-
Gowan and the firing squad situation are distinguishable, and the Utah
law is not necessarily constitutional under that case. McGowan, unfor-
tunately, does not provide a standard with which to measure the suffi-
ciency of secular purpose in a case like the firing squad, and none of
the case law appears to be of great use. Appeals to policy considera-
tions, therefore, must be the primary basis for constitutional assessment
of the firing squad.
226. For a discussion of forms "retributive" arguments, see Gardner, supra note 18, at 115-18.
227. For example, Immanuel Kant defended the principle that "the undeserved evil which any
one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetuated on himself," Kant, Justice and Punish-
ment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 103, 104 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972), but he
did not seem to believe that the actual form the murderer utilized in committing his offense should
be used in executing the murderer. Rather, retributive justice to Kant demanded that the mur-
derer be executed in a manner "entirely free of any maltreatment that would make an abomina-
tion of the humanity residing in the person suffering it." Kant, The Right to Punish, in
PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 35, 37 (J. Murphy ed. 1973). Retributive arguments support-
ing particular forms of execution for their peculiar power to expiate are not secular arguments and
have no useful place in a theory of punishment because they express no more than unverifiable
dogma. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 38-39 (1968).
228. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
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C. Policy Considerations-The Argument for Invalidating the Firing
Squad
1. General Policy Considerations
Strong policy reasons justify invalidation of the firing squad statute.
The establishment clause prohibits the government from promoting re-
ligious interests unless the promotion is necessary to insure the free ex-
ercise of religious belief. 229 To a significant extent at least, Utah
initially adopted the firing squad, and perhaps even capital punishment
itself, to promote religious belief. The weight given by the early Utah
legislators to an illicit objective thus determined the selection of their
form of capital punishment law. To the extent that they were relig-
iously motivated, the legislators treated as desirable a consequence to
which a lawfully motivated legislator would be indifferent or would
view as undesirable.3 0
All citizens, Mormons and Gentiles alike, are entitled to a full and
proper assessment of the secular merits of decisions made by their leg-
islative representatives.' If clear and convincing evidence exists to
establish that governmental measures were significantly influenced by
sectarian concerns, citizens have a legitimate complaint not only be-
cause of the impropriety of constitutionally illicit motivation itself, but
also because of the possible failure to attend adequately to the secular
merits of the decision.232
The history of the firing squad indicates that the legislature may
never have carefully considered the secular desirability of the hanging-
shooting option or of the firing squad itself. Religiously motivated leg-
islators initially passed the Utah law and recent legislators have done
little more than rubber-stamp subsequent revisions. Given this history,
a law that was improperly adopted exists on the books of Utah. But
because the law may in fact be useful and secularly advantageous, it
should not be invalidated solely on the basis of its origins. Rather, it
should be strictly scrutinized and upheld if the state can show that the
law promotes legitimate governmental interests that cannot be achieved
through reasonably available alternatives that do not entail the promo-
tion of sectarian concerns. If religiously neutral alternative means do
229. See notes 255-57 infra and accompanying text.
230. See Brest, supra note 1, at 116.
231. Seeid. at 116-17.
232. See id. at 116-34.
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exist, the law should be invalidated, given its suspicious pedigree, pro-
vided that invalidation does not result in infringements of religious lib-
erty. Because alternatives do exist to achieve the secular values
promoted by shooting capital offenders,233 it follows that the firing
squad is unconstitutional.
This "alternative means" analysis of the problem of sectarian moti-
vation is not unique to this article. The negative implication of Mc-
Gowan s reasoning suggests this analysis: if a religiously motivated law
is necessary to achieve the secular goals promoted by that law, it is
constitutional (the McGowan Sunday Closing Law); if a religiously mo-
tivated law is not necessary to achieve the secular goals promoted by
that law, it is likely unconstitutional (the negative implication of Mc-
Gowan).234  Although a majority of the Court has never specifically
adopted this approach, 3 individual Justices have espoused it,236 in-
cluding Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in McGowan,z37 as well
as a variety of commentators238 and several lower courts.239
If the courts adopted the alternative means approach, religious
groups would not be foreclosed from lobbying for legitimately secular
legislation. If the secular interests could be achieved only through the
means advocated by the lobbying religious groups, the legislation
would not be unconstitutional; if the secular purposes could be
achieved through religiously neutral means, those means could be
adopted. In either case the lobbying religious group would obtain leg-
233. See notes 219-26 supra and accompanying text.
234. See also Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment' and
*Free Exercise' Clauses, 42 TEX. L. REV. 142, 173 (1963). For a view that MeGowan actually
rejected the mode of analysis suggested in the text, see Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the
Religious Guarantees, 80 YALE L.J. 77, 79 (1970).
235. See Choper, supra note 205, at 309.
236. Prior to Walz, Justices Frankfurter and Brennan had both employed an "alternative
means" rationale in establishment clause cases. Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested that "[i]f a
statute furthers both secular and religious ends by means unnecessary to the effectuation of the
secular ends alone. . . the statute cannot stand." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466-67
( 1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Similarly, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he Constitution
enjoins those involvements of religions with secular institutions which . . . use essentially reli-
gious means to serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice." Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). A majority of the Court
never specifically embraced the "alternative means" analysis. See Choper, supra note 205, at 309.
237. See Choper. supra note 14, at 309.
238. See, e.g.. Choper, supra note 14, at 309. See generally Note, supra note 234.
239. See, e.g., Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 289 (E.D. Va. 1974); Murray v.
Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 398, 216 A.2d 897, 906 (1966).
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islation that promotes the secular ends it seeks. Furthermore, the stan-
dard objections to scrutiny of illicit motivation do not seem to be fatal
to this analysis. As discussed immediately below, this approach to in-
validating illicitly motivated legislation is not fraught with special diffi-
culties of ascertaining legislative motivation, nor with objections that
invalidation is futile, counterproductive, or improper.
2. Inapplicability of Standard Objections to Inquiries into Motivation
The claim that inquiries into legislative motivation should be
avoided because of the difficulty of ascertaining motivation is mis-
placed in establishment cases requiring analysis under the secular-pur-
pose test. As McGowan, Epperson, and West illustrate, it is permissible,
and in some cases necessary, to inquire about legislative motivation.
Fairly reliable conclusions of sectarian motivation can be made even if
circumstantial evidence is the sole basis for the conclusion.2 40 As Ep-
person and the Utah firing squad example illustrate, social and histori-
cal contexts may clearly indicate a religiously charged milieu; the
legislative products of that milieu may be best understood in religious
terms.241
Analytical problems in ascertaining legislative motivation do exist,
however, because the case law is of so little help in establishing either
the quantum of evidence necessary to constitute sectarian motivation or
the extent to which sectarian purposes must predominate over secular
purposes when both types of purposes exist. This article suggests that
"clear and convincing" evidence of sectarian motivation must exist
before a statute fails the secular-purposes test.242 If clear and convinc-
ing evidence of sectarian motivation exists but evidence of legitimate
secular purpose is also present, the alternative means analysis should
be used unless legislative amendments inconsistent with the original
religious purposes dictate a finding that secular purposes predominate
over prior religious ones.
Use of the alternative means analysis negates the objection that in-
validation of laws on the basis of legislative motivation is futile because
the legislature could simply reenact the same law for valid reasons.
Once a court invalidates a law under the alternative means rationale,
the legislature simply cannot reenact that law. Of course, the passage
240. See Brest, supra note 1, at 120-23.
241. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 23-24.
242. See note 215 supra.
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of time might justify reenactment of the old law if the present alterna-
tives to it have become less able to promote the underlying secular val-
ues than the old, religiously motivated law.
Even if the alternative means analysis does not preclude reenactment
of a law invalidated because of sectarian motivation, judicial invalida-
tion is not necessarily futile. "Judicial review of legislative motivation
is no more 'futile' merely because re-enactment is possible than appel-
late review is futile because an appellee may prevail again on remand
after a trial court is reversed for giving weight to inadmissible evidence
or misapplying the law. '243 Moreover, it does not follow that legisla-
tors will repass laws invalidated on the basis of sectarian motivation.
For example, invalidation of the firing squad statute may force the
Utah legislature to consider fully for the first time the secular merits of
the hanging-firing squad option as well as the merits of the firing squad
itself. Such "reconsideration," free from sectarian bias, may well result
in the adoption of new execution modes if, indeed, the state retains
capital punishment at all.2 "
Application of the "alternative means" analysis also meets the objec-
tion that it is counterproductive to invalidate laws that may effectuate
sound policy simply because these laws were religiously motivated. It
clearly would be counterproductive to invalidate the crime of murder
because it was originally a religious crime, but the analysis suggested
here would not have this effect. Surely, the state could show that there
are no reasonably available alternatives, short of punishing murder as
a criminal offense, that will achieve the secular interests of crime pre-
vention and fairness to offenders presently sought through murder stat-
utes. Moreover, McGowan would preclude invalidating murder under
the establishment clause because secular purposes have become
predominate during the course of amending murder statutes in a man-
ner inconsistent with the Biblical demand for an-eye-for-an-eye.
Invalidation of the firing squad, however, is a wholly different mat-
ter. It is not counterproductive to invalidate improperly enacted laws if
the same results can be achieved through laws properly adopted.
Rather, invalidation serves as a productive reminder to the legislature
that it is expected to act for the secular good of the people. To the
243. Brest, supra note 1, at 125.
244. For evidence that those favoring capital punishment for irrational reasons may be con-
verted through rational discourse to the abolitionist point of view, see Sarat & Vidmar, supra note
15.
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extent that the legislature treats an illicit objective as desirable or as a
benefit rather than a cost or a neutral factor, the legislature has not
properly evaluated the merit of the legislation enacted.245 Maintaining
governmental integrity is especially important in a context such as the
Utah case in which a single religious majority has traditionally influ-
enced the affairs of secular government. In this context, the invalida-
tion of the firing squad, even though enacted long ago, may encourage
good government by serving as a reminder to the legislature as well as
to Utah citizens that sectarian concerns may not unduly influence pub-
lic policy.
The final objection to invalidating statutes because of illicit legisla-
tive motivation is that invalidation implies disrespect for the integrity
of the legislative branch. Whatever the merits of this objection, Epper-
son and West illustrate that courts do scrutinize sectarian motivation
and invalidate laws that lack proper secular justification. Legislatures
sometimes do act improperly. When they act in violation of the estab-
lishment clause, the proper institutional balance of church and state is
upset. Judicial invalidation of legislation unduly motivated by sectar-
ian concerns is a means of restoring a proper church-state balance.
3. The Religion Clause Values
A further justification for invalidation of the firing squad statute is
the promotion of establishment clause values. This article already has
mentioned the potential for political strife among religious groups as a
consequence of introducing religious factors into the already controver-
sial area of capital punishment. Moreover, as long as the firing squad
remains the law, the potential also exists for a different kind of religio-
politico strife. The firing squad symbolizes the entanglement of reli-
gion and government that existed throughout early Utah history. How-
ever understandable that entanglement might once have been,24 6 it is
clearly inappropriate in the modern secular state. The firing squad rep-
245. Brest, supra note 1, at 128.
246. When the doctrine of blood atonement first became engrained in Utah law, there was no
reason to suppose that the first amendment was relevant to anything but Congressional action. In
fact, "[i]t was a common assumption in the first decades of the nineteenth century that state gov-
ernments may properly become the supporters and the friends of religion." M. HowE, stpra note
120, at 28. Few people believed that any provision of the Constitution set limits to the scope of
state authority. Id. at 88. Even after passage of the fourteenth amendment through which the
establishment clause ultimately would be applied to the states, most people thought for decades
that the amendment was designed to achieve the single purpose of securing Negro rights, Id See
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resents a vivid reminder of the uncomfortable possibility that Utah
may not have escaped its sectarian past. While this reminder may be
no more than a quaint anachronism to Mormons, Gentiles may per-
ceive its symbolism with bitterness and resentment towards their Mor-
mon neighbors. "Apart from the significance of symbols in
establishing precedents for more dangerous incursion, the fact of sym-
bolic governmental identification with a religious activity must be un-
derstood to constitute a separate evil in a system that regards matters of
religious concern as ultimately delegated to individual and community
conscience. '247 Invalidation of the firing squad as a mode of execution,
on the other hand, would symbolize both the secularization of Utah
society and the ideal that dominant religious groups should not unduly
influence political decisions. Thus, invalidation would promote both
the values of separatism and avoidance of political strife among reli-
gious groups.
Voluntarism, as the fundamental value that the religion clauses seek
to promote, also warrants careful consideration. Consideration of this
value involves issues of religious freedom, most generally conceptual-
ized under the free exercise clause, as they relate to the problem of the
Utah firing squad and to the establishment clause analysis proposed in
this article. For purposes of this consideration Jones v. Butz2 4 8 will be
examined in some depth not only because the case is a useful vehicle
for raising the religious freedom values relevant to this inquiry, but also
because the case is in some ways similar on its facts to the firing squad
problem.
D. Jones v. Butz-The Firing Squad- Free Exercise Right or
Permissible Accommodation?
1. Jones v. Butz
In Jones the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
also Note, First Amendment Religion Clause.- Historical Metamorphosis, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 760,
769-70 (1966).
247. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 868. This commentator continues:
ITihe religion clauses [embody] a fundamental personal right not to be a part of a com-
munity whose official organs endorse religious views that might be fundamentally inimi-
cal to one's deepest beliefs .... IT]he experience of living in a political community
which endorses or affirmatively supports religious positions with which one disagrees
may be regarded as a peculiar offense to freedom of conscience.
Id. at 869.
248. 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), afldmem., 419 U.S. 806 (1974).
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York upheld a federal statute that governed the procurement of meat
and meat products for the federal government. The statute defined hu-
mane methods of slaughtering livestock and specifically determined
that ritual slaughter according to Jewish tradition satisfied the defini-
tion.2 49 A variety of plaintiffs attacked the statute, alleging among
other things that the expenditure of their tax money to procure meat
slaughtered according to religious ritual violated the establishment
clause.2 50 The court acknowledged that plaintiffs had standing as tax-
payers to maintain the action,25' but found that the statute did not vio-
late the establishment clause because, among other things, plaintiffs
had failed to show that Congress purposely created a religious prefer-
ence in finding that ritual slaughter was "humane" under the act.252 It
was merely coincidental that Congress found the Jewish practice to be
a humane method of slaughter.253
The Jones court went further in dicta to suggest that even if the pro-
tection of ritual slaughter represented an intentional deference to Jew-
ish religion, the statute would not violate the first amendment, because
to hold the law violative of the establishment clause might well deprive
orthodox Jews of their rights under the free exercise clause to ritually
prepared meat, a commodity basic to their religious practice.25 4 The
court further suggested that even if access to ritually prepared meat
does not constitute a protected right under the free exercise clause, con-
gressional deference to ritual slaughter still would not offend the estab-
lishment clause because it probably would constitute a permissible
"accommodation" of religious liberty interests that otherwise would be
threatened.255
This interpretation of establishment doctrine is consistent with the
underlying values that the religion clauses promote. Applying the es-
tablishment clause in a manner that inhibits legitimate religious prac-
tice offends the principle of voluntarism-the fundamental first
amendment value. That application of the establishment clause also
would be inconsistent with the principle of separatism because govern-
249. Id. at 1286.
250. Id. at 1291.
251. Id. at 1287-89.
252. Id. at 1291-92.
253. Id. at 1292.
254. Id. at 1287, 1292-93.
255. Id at 1292-93.
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ment would be assuming a hostile rather than a neutral posture to-
wards religion.
Hence, no analysis of a problem under the establishment clause
should be concluded without consideration of the companion free exer-
cise clause.2 16 Conclusions of unconstitutionality under the establish-
ment clause are tenuous if the consequences entail infringements of
legitimate religious liberty interests protected under the free exercise
clause. Thus, circumstances of tension between the establishment and
free exercise clauses generally should be resolved in favor of the lat-
ter217 to promote the value of voluntarism.
At the time the Utah legislature adopted the firing squad, the Mor-
mon Church taught the doctrine of blood atonement. Analysis of the
current status of the firing squad, however, must consider the possibil-
ity that the religious motivation underpinning the Utah law is a legiti-
mate attempt to protect religious liberty. If so, the sectarian motivation
is not "illicit" and would not constitute a basis for invalidating the
firing squad provision.
2. The Firing Squad as a Free Exercise Right
It appears impossible to defend the claim that the practice of blood
atonement by means of the firing squad ever constituted a protected
right to religious practice under the free exercise clause. Thus, invali-
dation of the firing squad, even during the period that blood atonement
was a teaching of the Mormon Church, could not have resulted in an
infringement of constitutionally protected rights because governmental
coercion of belief is the essence of free exercise violation. Violations of
the free exercise clause usually are triggered by positive governmental
action that infringes upon religious interests.258 It is thus difficult to see
how any free exercise claims could arise from governmentalfailure to
enact a bloodspilling mode of execution. Elimination of the firing
squad would have coerced no one's beliefs, but instead would have re-
stored government to a neutral posture in relation to the Mormon faith,
256. See P. KAUPER, supra note 134, at 45; Moore, supra note 234, at 151.
257. See L. TRIB , supra note 4, at 833.
258 The language of the first amendment is phrased in terms of governmental action, not
inaction. "Congress shall make no law ...prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. Governmental actions that accommodate the beliefs of particular religions gen-
erally are not justifiable protections of free exercise, but rather are unconstitutional establish-
ments. "[Liaws which protect the free exercise of religion should be distinguished from those
which merely promote the exercise of a particular religion." Moore, supra note 234, at 196-97.
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neither aiding nor hindering religious belief and practice.259
It could be true, of course, that had the firing squad been abandoned
during a time when blood atonement was a viable Mormon teaching,
the rite could not have been legally practiced in any jurisdiction in the
nation.26 Individual Mormon offenders who desired to atone for their
sins by shedding their blood might have regarded this as a serious con-
sequence. However unfortunate this consequence might have been for
these persons, religious groups often must abandon religious practices
when those practices conflict with legal prohibitions, as the Mormons
well know.26' As fundamentalist Christians might feel expressions of
their faith restricted by legal prohibitions against handling poisonous
snakes,262 or Jehovah's Witnesses spirtually offended by compulsory
blood transfusions,263 so might some Mormon capital offenders have
felt deprived of salvation if blood atonement were not available.
The tenuousness of the claim that elimination of the firing squad in
Utah would violate a constitutionally protected right to practice blood
atonement can be further illustrated. If, at a time when blood atone-
ment was a viable doctrine, a Mormon offender had committed murder
in State X where capital punishment had been abandoned, the mur-
derer would not have possessed a constitutional right to die for that
crime,26 let alone to die in a manner that would effectuate blood
atonement. The practice of blood atonement in this jurisdiction,
259. "The command of the establishment clause ... is a neutral one: Government [should]
not take sides either for or against any religious belief." Moore, supra note 234, at 198; P.
KAUPER, supra note 134, at 59.
260. See notes 18, 89-92 supra and accompanying text.
261. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
262. The use of snakes in religious rituals has been prohibited to maintain the public health.
See Hill v. Alabama, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So.2d 880 (1956); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky.
437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949); Harden v. State,
188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
263. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967)
(three-judge court), aj'dmem., 390 U.S. 598 (1968). See also L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND
THE CONSTITUTION 323-24 (1975).
264. For a philosophical argument that a capital offender does not possess a right to compel
the state to execute him even if the state employs capital punishment for his crime, see H. BEDAU,
supra note 15, at 121-25. "In the absence of controlling constitutional provisions, the manner of
execution of death sentences is for legislative enactment," 24B C.J.S. Criwinal Law § 1975 (1962),
religious considerations notwithstanding. "Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a
necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government
under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?" Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (dicta). "Can a man excuse his practices [that are contrary to law] because of
his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
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whether performed by the state or by private individuals, would have
constituted unjustifiable homicide.265 If no constitutional right to prac-
tice blood atonement existed in State X, it is difficult to see how it pos-
sibly could have existed in Utah. 266 Thus, whatever rights Mormons
may have had to practice blood atonement in Utah appear to be statu-
tory, not constitutional, in origin.
3. The Firing Squad as a Permissible 4ccommodation?
The court in Jones refused to strike down the ritual slaughter provi-
sion not only because invalidation of the statute might have constituted
an infringement of constitutionally protected rights under the free exer-
cise clause, but also because the protection of ritual slaughter appeared
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."
Id. at 166-67.
265. "Homicide is the killing of a human being by a human being." R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 1969). Unless capital punishment is expressly authorized by the state,
execution of criminal offenders constitutes unjustifiable criminal homicide. See id. at 33-34. See
also note 264 supra.
266. Claims of a constitutional right to practice blood atonement under the free exercise clause
are further suspect when the logic of the blood atonement doctrine is scrutinized. The doctrine
may well have been theologically incoherent in light of other Mormon doctrine, and thus would
have been difficult to take seriously as a matter of Latter-day Saint faith. The Supreme Court has
held that the truth of religious beliefs that motivate conduct violative of public policy cannot be
judicially considered, but rigorous questioning of the sincerity of the belief is appropriate. See
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See also L. PFEFFER, supra note 263, at 305-08.
Beliefs alleged to be protected under the free exercise clause receive no protection unless seriously
held. Mormon doctrine teaches the universal salvation of all mankind through the atonement of
Christ and the exercise of diligence in observing God's commandments. See notes 22-23 supra
and accompanying text. The Latter-day Saints' gospel offers hope of salvation to all. But if the
only means of salvation for murderers were through blood atonement, all murderers who commit-
ted their crimes outside the State of Utah would have been eternally damned. This consequence
would have been inconsistent with the fundamentals of the Mormon plan of salvation. Redemp-
tion is conditioned on faith and repentence, not on the fortuity that one's sins happened to be
committed in a particular geographical location. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. Blood
atonement may have made some theological sense at a time when the Saints were all gathered in a
place where the doctrine could be practiced. But given the modern realities of capital punishment
law outside Utah, it is doubtful the doctrine could have been reconciled with more fundamental
tenets of Mormonism. The constitutional free exercise guarantee also does not protect a doctrine
that had no serious following.
Closely related to the question of sincerity is the element of how central or essential to
the religion is the practice affected by the prohibition or requirement. Clearly a conflict
which threatens the very survival of the religion or the core values of a faith poses more
serious free exercise problems than does a conflict which merely inconveniences the
faithful.
L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 862. Thus, it would not appear that abandonment of the firing squad
would "threaten the very survival or core values" of Mormonism.
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to be a permissible "accommodation" to religious belief. Thus, even if
Congress was not required to protect ritual slaughter, the Jones court
concluded that Congress was permitted to do so.
The Jones court referred to a variety of Supreme Court opinions that
held permissible governmental accommodations to religious practices
in certain circumstances, although not actually required as a matter of
free exercise.267 For example, the Sunday Closing Laws of some states
exempt Sabbatarians from statutory obligations imposed on non-Sab-
batarians. While the Supreme Court has held that no free exercise
right to this exemption exists,26 the Court views statutory exemption of
Sabbatarians as a permissible accommodation to religious practice.269
Likewise, the Court has upheld exemptions of conscientious objectors
from the draft "because otherwise religious objectors would be forced
into conduct that their religions forbid."270 Similarly, courts view gov-
ernmental provision of chaplains for soldiers and prisoners who are
"cut off by the state from all civilian opportunities for public commu-
nion" as a legitimate accommodation to the religious needs of those so
cut Off.2 7 1 These accommodation cases represent instances in which the
proliferation of governmental action in modem times has invaded pri-
vate life, threatening the enjoyment of what had previously been a
privileged area of religious practice.272 Because of the coercive effect of
267. 374 F. Supp. at 1292.
268. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961).
269. See Arlan's Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962), which dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question an appeal of a Kentucky Court of Appeals case that upheld a Sunday
Closing Law that included a blanket exemption for Sabbatarians as a permissible accommodation
of religious practice.
270. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369-70 (1970) (White, J., dissenting). See also
Selected Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918). The Court has stated in dictum that
Congress need not grant an exemption for any conscientious objectors. Compare Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905), with Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 359 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
271. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297-300 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
272. Professor Laurence Tribe describes instances of permissible and required religious classi-
fications by government as follows:
The. . .use of religion-based classifications to relieve religious persons of both direct
and indirect burdens caused by increased governmental involement in private 4/e...
recognize[s] that government's actions impinge on different persons in dramatically dif-
ferent ways, so that truly even-handed treatment at times compels exempting those
whose religious beliefs are exceptionally burdened by a challenged state action. In this
zone of required accomodation, the theory is that only an illusory and hostile neutrality
would be achieved by pursuing a religion-blind constitutional ideal.
L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 821 (first emphasis supplied). Tribe suggests elsewhere that the need for
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273this increased governmental action on religion, government is said to
have assumed a hostile posture that becomes religiously neutral only
when special accommodation is made to protect the affected religious
interest.27
4
One may argue that although there may never have been a first
amendment right to practice blood atonement, the state's acquiescence
in the practice through the firing squad, like the state's protection of
ritual slaughter in Jones, constituted a permissible "accommodation"
to religion rather than a violation of the establishment clause. Thus, if
this deference to Mormon belief constituted a legitimate accommoda-
tion to religious belief, the sectarian motivation would not be unconsti-
tutional. Of course, the line between permissible accommodation and
prohibited establishment is often difficult to draw, but the firing squad
apparently represents the latter.275 This seems especially so when one
examines the nature of the possible "accommodation." Unlike the ac-
commodation cases discussed, Utah's promotion of religion through its
capital punishment law is not a consequence of state attempts to ac-
commodate a religious privilege that prior governmental action had ad-
government to accommodate religious belief arises because the emergence of an increasingly per-
vasive "affirmative state" requires positive governmental provision to protect religious pluralism.
1d. at 834, 851.
273. Id.
274. The State must be steadfastly neutral in all matters of faith, and neither favor nor
inhibit religion. In my view, government cannot sponsor religious exercises in the public
schools without jeopardizing that neutrality. On the other hand, hostility, not neutrality,
would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners
and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities for public -communion.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
275. Professor Tribe would resolve possible clashes between forbidden establishment and per-
missible accommodation in favor of the latter if the governmental promotion of religion is "argua-
bly compelled" by the free exercise clause. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 822. In cases in which the
two religion clauses intersect, the free exercise clause carves out of the establishment clause a zone
of permissible accommodation. Id. at 823. Applying the Tribe test to the firing squad law sug-
gests that the firing squad constitutes a forbidden establishment, not a permissible accommoda-
tion, because the firing squad does not seem to be even "arguably compelled" by the free exercise
clause. A constitutional right to die by firing squad would entail a free exercise right even in
jurisdictions that have abolished capital punishment, but these jurisdictions presumably could
show a "compelling state interest" in promoting respect for human life through maintenance of a
policy against state executions and thus defeat a claim that the free exercise clause requires state
executions as a means of atoning for sin. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); notes
264-66 supra and accompanying text. While the Supreme Court recently ruled that capital pun-
ishment is sometimes permissible under the eighth amendment, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), it seems unlikely that the Court would rule that it is constitutionally required of all states,
even of those whose policy is to oppose it, under the free exercise clause.
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versely affected. Utah had assumed no hostile stance toward the
Mormons that would create a special need for state deference to reli-
gious practice.276 Blood atonement was not a privileged religious ex-
ercise until the government gave its blessing to the practice.277 In fact,
blood atonement by means of the firing squad, far from being privi-
leged religious practice prior to governmental "accommodation,"
would have been unjustified homicide if practiced extralegally. 278
Thus, it is difficult to interpret the Utah capital punishment law as a
permissible accommodation to otherwise privileged activity. Rather
than "accommodating" an old religious privilege, the firing squad pro-
vision created a new one. It thus smacks more of "establishment" than
"accommodation." If the courts were to invalidate the firing squad law
as an unconstitutional establishment, government would not coerce in-
dividuals away from legitimate religious practice even if blood atone-
ment were a presently viable doctrine. Because the practice was not
privileged but for the governmental action, invalidation of the firing
squad would effectively neutralize the state's proreligious posture.
Neutralization would promote the value of separatism and would be
consistent with the principle of voluntarism because it would not in-
fringe upon legitimate religious interests of either Mormons or non-
Mormons. The principle of voluntarism may actually require invalida-
tion of the firing squad law to protect the religious liberty of non-
Mormons because minority religious practice is disadvantaged and the
ideal of free competition of religious sects, as expressed in the Williams
and Madison first amendment traditions, is offended whenever a ma-
276. Of course, one could argue that the homicide laws forbidding extralegal capital punish-
ment curtailed the possibilities for the Mormon Church itself to practice blood atonement, and
thus constituted governmental interference with the practice of religion. Notwithstanding that the
homicide laws are not the product of the modem "affirmative state," and thus do not represent the
kind of governmental action usually found in "accommodation" cases, see note 272 supra, this
argument would be rejected by reference to a variety of cases forbidding religious practices that
run afoul of basic secular policy. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Forbidding
the execution of murderers except through the operation of secular law seems to be as basic a
public policy as there is, and one not likely to be deviated from even in the name of religious
freedom. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 850-51; notes 264-65 supra and accompanying text.
277. It might be argued that blood atonement could have been privileged during the brief time
the Mormons occupied Mexican territory in what is now the State of Utah. Whether Mexican law
would have permitted a religious group to practice a form of capital punishment is doubtful, but
there is no question that at the time the language of the present law was adopted in the late
nineteenth century, blood atonement was not a privileged religious practice.
278. See notes 264-65, 276 supra.
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jority religion uses secular government for its purposes.279
No infringements of religious liberty, either of the free exercise
"right" variety or of the "privileged" accommodation variety, would
arise if the courts held the firing squad law unconstitutional because of
the sectarian motivation that contributed to its birth. Invalidation of
the firing squad statute would promote the values of separatism and the
prevention of religio-politico strife; the value of voluntarism, if not ac-
tually promoted, certainly would not be offended. Therefore, the con-
clusion that the firing squad is unconstitutional under the
establishment clause appears sound.
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR REVIEWING SECTARIAN
MOTIVATION-A SUMMARY
From the foregoing analysis of the Utah firing squad it is possible to
abstract a set of general principles for the judicial review of sectarian
motivation under the establishment clause. Because these principles
undoubtedly require further refinement and raise a variety of problems
themselves, they are suggested merely as a rough framework from
which to analyze legislation under the secular-purpose test. Although
this framework may be rough, it should be useful in furthering analysis
that is both consistent with existing case law and relevant policy con-
siderations.
Principle No. 1
Because of the inherent difficulties of ascertaining religious motiva-
tion and the debatable propriety of questioning legislative integrity
through inquiry into illicit motivation, courts should use the primary-
effect prong of analysis to examine statutes challenged under the estab-
lishment clause, except when religiously motivated statutes lack signifi-
cant religious effect or when no possible secular purposes can be
attributed to the statute. When a secular purpose presents the potential
for generating religio-politico strife under the excessive-entanglement
prong, especially strong reason exists for strict scrutiny under the secu-
lar-purpose test or the primary-effect test. Failure to satisfy the exces-
sive-entanglement prong is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition
for strict scrutiny.
279. See note 247 supra and accompanying text.
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Princiole No. 2:
In all cases in which clear and convincing evidence of significant sec-
tarian motivation exists, but no secular purposes exist or the purported
secular purposes are no more than rationalizations for religious motiva-
tion, the religiously motivated statute is unconstitutional unless invali-
dation of the statute results in significant infringements of religious
liberty. If invalidation of the statute would result, or would ever have
resulted, in significant violations of free exercise rights, or if the statute
constituted a permissible accommodation to religious belief at the time
of its enactment, the religious motivation is not "illicit" and the statute
should be upheld.
Princiole No. 3
In all cases in which clear and convincing evidence of significant sec-
tarian motivation exists and legitimate secular purposes also exist or
could exist, but no significant religious effects exist, the religiously mo-
tivated statute is unconstitutional if the secular interests can be equally
achieved through reasonably available alternatives that do not entail
promotion of sectarian concerns, except when legislative amendments
inconsistent with the original religious purposes dictate a finding that
secular purposes have come to predominate over the prior religious
purposes, or when invalidation of the statute results in significant in-
fringements of religious liberty. If invalidation of the statute would
result, or would ever have resulted, in significant violations of free exer-
cise rights, or if the statute constituted a permissible accommodation to
religious belief at the time of its enactment, the religious motivation is
not "illicit" and the statute should be upheld.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article examined the proposition that sectarian motivation is
sometimes a sufficient condition for invalidating legislation under the
establishment clause. Through a consideration of a paradigmatic ex-
ample of religiously motivated legislation (the Utah firing squad), it has
shown that illicit motivation is sometimes a legally and philosophically
sound basis for invalidating statutes even when the legislation lacks sig-
nificant religious effect. This consideration of the firing squad case
generated analytical principles that offer a useful means for structuring
analysis of sectarian motivation under the establishment clause.
Although the problem of illicit motivation in the establishment con-
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text has received little attention from courts or commentators, it never-
theless is a matter of genuine importance. To paraphrase the poet
whose words began this paper, even though it may not be the greatest
constitutional treason for the legislature to do an otherwise permissible
deed for the wrong reason, it is sufficient "treason" (in the contexts
defined in this paper) to warrant the careful attention of the courts.
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